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An Empirical Analysis On The Relationship Between Corporate

Posted on:2014-02-09Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J DengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2249330398492782Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years, with the development of the capital market, the major problems areconstantly emerging, such as Delong, silver Guangsha series of cases, the United Statesof America Enron accounting scandal, World-Com bankruptcy case, these make thestock market and investors suffered serious injuries, the basis of credit capital marketsuffered a major blow, even the companies of Enron and Andersen with great famedeceive investors, not only hit public confidence, but also make corporate governanceissues become the focus of domestic and foreign theory and practice research. Theygradually realize that corporate governance structure is not rational, not perfect, is likelyto lead to failure of the listing Corporation, the mechanism of balance of powerenterprise management efficiency is low, the interests of small shareholders is invadedby large shareholders. Especially in the face of emerging market such as China, thepresent conditions of China’s corporate governance are as follows: external marketenvironment is not perfect, the capital market, occupation manager market, productmarket, property market and legal environment have yet to be perfected; the internalgovernance structure has more problems, like the phenomenon of one stock dominance,management layer of administration, internal control, financial fraud, also it is oftenseen., which have a greater impact on enterprise performance, China’s listingCorporation governance structure needs to be improved. The agency problem ofcorporate governance mechanism is mainly used to solve the separation of ownershipand control of the relationship, for the agency problems between shareholders andexecutives to coordinate and listing Corporation, especially the supervision andincentive for managers of the shareholders. So it is of great significance to study on therelationship between internal corporate governance structure and corporate performance.Corporate governance can improve enterprise competition in enterprise performance,enterprise development speed is enhanced and plays a decisive role, a good corporategovernance structure is an important guarantee for enterprise sustainable development,to reduce the cost, improve the enterprise value; a steady growth for the rationalallocation of resources and economy. At present, domestic and foreign scholars to studyon the relationship between the internal governance and corporate performance ismainly the relationship between financing structure, ownership structure, executiveincentive and firm performance. This paper is based on the results of domestic and foreign scholars, according tothe current situation of China’s listing Corporation, we analyze comprehensively thefactors affecting the performance of the company from the aspects of corporategovernance structure, including ownership structure, board characteristics, executiveincentive and the board of supervisors, taken the Shanghai A shares of listingCorporation as the research object, mainly adopts the normative analysis and empiricalanalysis of a combination of research methods, qualitative analysis and quantitativeanalysis, empirical analysis, use SPSS17.0software. Mainly include the followingaspects:(1) Based on a review of related domestic and foreign research literature, researchdirection is proposed in this paper, comprehensively expounded the meaning ofcorporate governance, corporate governance structure is composed of shareholders,board of directors, executives, board of supervisors, is a system of enterprisemanagement and control. Three characteristics of the corporate governance is theresponsibilities, duties; principal-agent, longitudinal authorization; incentive andrestriction mechanism. The basic theory of corporate governance mechanism is theincomplete contract theory, principal-agent theory, property rights theory, stake holdertheory. And we discuss the defects in the governance structure of China’s listingCorporation. We elaborate the connotation of corporate performance and corporateperformance of the three indexes, like the rate of return on net assets, Tobin Q value,market value added and their differences.(2)Empirical research on the basis of theoretical analysis, taken the Shanghai Ashares of listing Corporation in China as the sample, with the data processing, we select5262samples, using regression analysis, descriptive statistics, correlation analysis,regression analysis, with the rate of return on net assets as a measure of the performanceof the company, probes into the relationship between the main part of corporategovernance structure and corporate performance, including ownership structure, boardof directors, executive incentive, supervisory board size, and provide theoretical andempirical evidence for perfecting the corporate governance structure, specificconclusions are as follows: moderate concentration of ownership has significantpositive correlation to corporate performance, chairman concurrently general managerhelp on the improvement of corporate performance, the proportion of independentdirectors and board of supervisors number increasing can improve corporate performance but the effect is not significant, under the present enterprise system, theeffect of the proportion of management shareholding is contrary to the expect.(3)Puts forward proposals on how to improve corporate governance, namely theoptimization of ownership structure, improve the structure of board of directors, perfectincentive mechanism and perfect the function of the board of supervisors, in order toform the governance mechanism of the separation of the three powers, checks andbalances.
Keywords/Search Tags:Corporate governance, Corporate performance, Shareholder structure, Executive incentive, Board structure
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