Game Analysis Of Enterprise Pollution Supervision Under The Constraint Of Environmental Capacity

With the rapid development of China’s social economy, people’s living standardhas been improved. But at the same time as the our country economy industrialstructure is not reasonable, in the economic development the government excessiveemphasis on the role of GDP but sacrifice environmental quality, enterprises and thepublic have poor environmental protection consciousness. Moreover, the governmentenvironmental supervision department has many loopholes and problems in thesupervision of the enterprise emission behavior, which have made many enterprisedischarge pollutants discretionarily, these behaviors lead environmental pollutionproblem deteriorate day by day. Therefore, how the government environmentalrelevant department establish an effective regulatory mechanism to superviseenterprise emission behavior and mitigate environmental pollution condition, whichnot only a looking-forward major subject in environmental economics managementresearch field, but also a real problem which urgently need to solve and face on ourcountry’s environmental governance. Environmental pollution problems have thecharacteristics of complexity, dynamics and information’s asymmetry betweensupervision and management. The development of game theory provide an effectivetheoretical analysis tool for solving these environment characteristics and deepunderstanding all kinds of conflict relations in each stakeholders.At present many scholars have introduced the game theory into the managementand governance of environmental pollution. Among which they just used the gametheory to qualitatively analysis the measures of environmental pollution managementpolicy, or researched and discussed various kinds of economic instruments andapplication method in environmental management. But in the game theory modelanalysis few scholars take environmental capacity, core factor closely linked toenvironmental quality, into consideration, and in the game theory analysis ofgovernment supervision and enterprise emission behavior scholars also haven’t noregard the political cost generating from government supervision. In this paper, firstly, we introduced and summarized the environmental capacityand enterprise emission behavior. Secondly, using the evolutionary game theory toanalyze how the sewage enterprises to make choice within both side of the game andstabilize strategy in the limited condition of environmental capacity. And under thegame analysis of government and public supervision with enterprise respectively,when considered two variables of political cost factors and spirit income acquiredfrom public participation in environmental protection, which made influence on thegame equilibrium strategy. Thirdly, we took Chongqing a chemical industry emissionsupervision as an example to confirm and analyze the game model result whichabove-mentioned. Finally, we presented conclusion and provided policy advices fromgovernment, emission enterprise and public point, so as to promoted carry outenvironmental pollution management work smoothly.