Research On The Trading Of The Engineering Design Know-how

Engineering design is the important link in the process of engineeringconstruction, which has a direct influence of the engineering project’s cost andadvancement. Because the technical requirement of different industries’ constructionprojects is so different, a batch of know-how that is suitable for differentcharacteristics’ construction projects has formed in the engineering design stage, andthe know-how greatly promotes the achievement of the goals of constructionprojects, which ensures the operational efficiency and quality. The trade ofengineering design know-how is the power base of technology innovation andimportant economic support, playing an important role in the promotion of technicallevel in the engineering design industry, so this article standing in the angle ofgovernment studies the trade of engineering design know-how.Firstly, paper combining with the concept of know-how and the characteristicsof the engineering design know-how defines the concept of engineering designknow-how. According to the characteristics of the engineering design know-how,this paper analyses the agent and influence factors of the trade of engineering designknow-how and the general process of trading, and on this basis analyzing thecomposition of the transaction price of engineering design know-how.Then paper analyzes the trading process of the engineering design know-how.By building qualitative and quantitative models, we analyze the issue of informationasymmetry between the seller and the buyer before and after the trading. Gamemodel is constructed based on the seller’s information asymmetric, analyzing thegame process between the buyer and the seller during the metaphase of transactionby the means of engineering design know-how’s ownership and use right trading,analyzing the adverse selection problem by the game model. Game model isconstructed based on the buyer’s information asymmetric, analyzing the gameprocess between the buyer and the seller during the later stage of transaction, on thebase of which analyzes the moral hazard problem. Because the trading price ofengineering design know-how is an important problem which can’t be ignored, thispaper constructs a model of price range for the buyer and seller, and on this basisbuilds pricing game model under two kinds of trading means.Finally, paper constructs incentives models for preventing the adverse selectionand moral hazard problem in the trading of engineering design know-how, andbuilds incentive mechanism for the trading of engineering design know-how to promote the trading of engineering design know-how orderly and sustainable.