Experimental Research On Ultimatum Collective Action Failure

Liziba village forest patrol team has been builded up to now since January2003, through voluntary Xunshan Ranger, paid patrol, patrol protocol three historical stages, but the village collective patrol activities are seldom carried out now. The typical failure case study of Chinese farmers’ collective behavior analysis s, exploratory analysis of peasant collective behavior, has the important influence of coordinated development of health problem for the logic, the urbanization development of deeper understanding of farmers’ collective action and regional economic. But for China farmers "traditional interpretation of good points and bad" theory, mostly based on the Chinese farmers narrow smallholder economy consciousness, tragedy of the commons, the prisoner’s Dilemma, paradox collective behavior and other conventional theory. However, according to the interview and investigation, the author finds that the reasons for the failure of the collective behavior of social norms is a serious lack of fair and the shock by the acquaintance society in traditional rural China under the condition of market economy, the author hopes to find out the root cause of Liziba village forest patrol this collective action failure, these two aspects practical implications to further study of peasants’ collective behavior of fairness and the market mechanism’s influence on the acquaintance society.As to a verification of the theory, this paper use the method of experimental economics in Wen country Liziba village of Gansu Province on the village forest patrol team organized by an ultimatum game experiment, conducting an ultimatum game experiment on forest patrol team of26members in Liziba Village. This paper draws the following conclusion:Liziba forest patrol team as a team, they have a common view on fairness of social norms, including96.15%bidder gives a fair bid or super fair bid in the experiment, showing that the forest patrol team in the village basic unit on the fairness norm preference. While the receiver at the lowest acceptance bids for the amount of half of the proportion of nearly50%(of course there are some recipients (46.1%) were willing to accept the lowest bid for the less than half that amount), they have a strong fairness preference for traditional acquaintances society foundation, even taking drastic steps to sacrifice their own interests to maintain the fairness preference. The experimental results also shows that the market economy mechanism with invasion on traditional community, and along with the evolution of cooperation mode in small scale in the community--after missing the fairness norm rural community, there are also rely on the relationship between traditional acquaintances society and the relationship between people to reshape the new balance of cooperation. It can thus be seen that the collective behavior of small scale community spontaneous organizations, has a profound significance on the rural environment protection, Collective action and rural urbanization.