| R&D investment is a kind of high-risky and high-return investment, which playsan important role in enhancing the core competitiveness of enterprises. There appearsan attracting phenomenon in the modern market economy competition, that is, in orderto promote the success rate of R&D investment, the enterprises which werecompetitors start trend of cooperative R&D and found a R&D alliance. In thecooperation in R&D within the alliance, it is one of the burning questions that how tomake enterprises reduce opportunistic behaviors and increase investment of R&Dresources, so as to promote the success rate of the alliance.This paper consider the additional cost of supervision and the stalemate incomewhen investment spillover exists and study the impact of investment spillover, thestructure of R&D alliance and profit sharing arrangement on R&D investment strategy,which provides theoretical guidance for the alliance in terms of increasing investmentof R&D resources, preventing free ride and promoting the success rate. First, paperelaborate the basic concept and theory in relevant to investment spillover, the structureof R&D alliance and R&D investment strategy and introduce the relevant theory of thealliance to provide theoretical support for the later part; Second, considering theadditional cost of supervision and the stalemate income under the circumstances ofinvestment spillover, paper build up alliance enterprises’ R&D investment game modelin different R&D alliance structures and different profit-sharing arrangements, and findthe solution of equilibrium; Third, use the game equilibrium solution to calculate theexpected input of enterprises R&D investment, and then classify and contrast theresults through which paper draw the main conclusions. Here is the conclusion:(1)investment spillover helps enterprises increase R&D investment.(2) under theproportional profit-sharing arrangement, concentration R&D alliance is better than itscounterpart in increasing investment and taking part in the R&D activity within thealliance when the rate of return on investment is moderate; under the equallyprofit-sharing arrangement, concentration R&D alliance is better than its counterpartwhen the rate of return on investment isn’t high; while in other cases, the two R&Dalliance structures have little influence on R&D investment strategy.(3) Under the same R&D alliance structure, profit-sharing arrangements’ influence on R&Dinvestment strategies is related to the rate of return on investment and the additionalcost of supervision. Finally, paper put forward relevant measures and suggestions onincreasing R&D investment and reducing the speculation. |
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