A Study On Innovation Incentive Of R&d Alliance With Profit-sharing Arrangement And Financial Subsidies

With the acceleration of technological change, shorter product life cycles, as well as intensifier market competition, only relying on limited internal skills and resources to conduct R &D has become increasingly difficult, so more and more companies tend to use alliances to conduct R&D activities. Cooperative R&D can bring on many benefits, such as sharing resources, sharing costs and risks, and forming synergies and so on. However, due to externalities of innovation, high-cost and high-tech risk factors of research and development activities, and inadequate corporate R&D, cooperative R&D alliances can not completely solve the problem.Considering of innovation incentives of R&D alliance issues, usually it can be improved through market mechanisms and government regulation. Market mechanisms including the establishment of R&D alliance revenue allocation mechanism, the union contract improvement, preferred partners and alliance members, mean to prevent moral hazard, encourage technological innovation, and increase R&D investment.Government regulation, including the adoption of fiscal subsidies, tax incentives, government procurement, public investment and other measures, mean to stimulate R&D alliance for technological innovation, increase R&D investment.This paper focuses on the investment shortage of R&D alliance technological innovation, mainly from the two below aspects; one is profit-sharing arrangement mechanism design of market mechanism in the R&D alliance, the other is financial subsidy policy of government regulation.In the profit-sharing arrangement studies of R&D alliance, this paper used Shapley value method to quantify the R&D spillover effect between alliance members, analyze the effect of this distribution method on the investment strategy of union members and the realize of members of the optimal investment strategy. And the improvement of the method is to finally decide the allocation of a reasonable mechanism, meet the union members to participate in the two conditions of constraints and incentive, so that union members driven by self-interested behavior will take the activities of enlarger R&D investment, which will reduce moral hazard, and make a alliance success of the incentives of allocation mechanism.In the government financial subsidy policy research, due to the different stages of R&D spillover which contains investment overflow and achievement spillover the two forms, the paper respectively establishes game models of cooperative R&D, and one is based on investment overflow and technological risks spillover, while the other is based on technological risks and achievement spillover. Analysis of the effect of different financial subsidies on the investment strategy of the union members were given, besides, research of the R&D and production strategies of alliance members as well as the size of social welfare in the different government subsidies were also given. Based on this, to aim for maximize social welfare, the paper found out the optimal government R&D subsidy policy in the different external environment, to encourage corporation R&D investment increased, to increase the social welfare, and to provide decision support for the Government to formulate relevant policies.