Studies Of The Relationship Between The Governance Structure And Corporate Performance Of China’s Private Listed Companies

Corporate governance has always been the focus of research scholars.With the development of China’s economy, China’s private listed companies is becoming more and more important.At this stage, however, China’s private governance of listed companies is generally worse.From the ownership structure, China’s listed companies have a higher ownership concentration.There are many companies form by the layer-holdings and cross-shareholdings, formed a pyramid ownership structure.The equity of China’s private listed company is also more concentrated.There is also the phenomenon of "Dominance" and deviation of the voting rights and cash flow rights.The company’s internal governance mechanisms constrained by the ownership structure.This leads to the status of family control and "key" control in private listed companies.Major shareholders against the interests of minority shareholders have been common.From information disclosure,irregularities of Private Listed Companies are more common than non-private listed companies. Williamson once pointed out:even if the corporate in an fair competition environment, with a very clear ownership relationship, if we can not establish a complete and efficient corporate governance mechanism, it is difficult to maintain long-term higher operating performance.This article discussed the governance structure of China’s private listed companies through the theoretical and empirical analysis.In order to find effective measures to improve the governance structure of China’s private listed companies,and improve corporate performance ultimately.Firstly this article comprehensively analyzes the literature of corporate governance performance.Due to the different indicators selected, the results of different scholars are not the same.On the basis of theoretical analysis,we analyze the complexity of the principal-agent relationship of private listed companies.Pointed out that the private listed companies have seven different principal-agent relationship.With the performance evaluation theory,analyze the logical framework of private listed companies,and analyze the private listed corporate governance performance through empirical analysis.The paper selected301private listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in2011, from the the CSMAR financial database.In order to increase the validity of the data, the selected companies are listed privatization before2007, and excluding the impact of the ST, PT shares.Using SPSS16.0software regression analysis,study the impact of private listed corporate governance structure on corporate performance from the aspect of ownership structure, board characteristics and incentives mechanism,with ROE as performance metrics.Finally,we conclude the recommendations for the improvement of the governance structure of China’s private listed companies,on the basis of the study.Through appropriate increasing in the ownership concentration, establishing the the Board for enterprise-scale, improving the system of independent directors and incentives,to improve the governance of China’s private listed companies,ultimately improve business performance and corporate sustainability.