On Pricing Model Of Telecommunication Service

Telecommunication services increasingly become the main means ofcommunication in people’s lives. Telecommunication industry is an important strategicindustry of China national economy to achieve growth, undertake the transfer ofindustrial structure. With the deepening reform of telecommunication industry, thetelecom market become more and more competitive and the telecommunicationcompanies have more pricing decision-making power. At the same time, with thegrowing scale of telecommunication industry, the differentiated demands of consumersincreasing. Under this background, on the one hand, the original price regulationmethods can not apply to today’s telecommunication market, need more consideringwith the perspective of corporate decision-making; On the other hand, the existingtelecommunication pricing decision theoretical system is not complete. Therefore, basedon the point of view of the corporate decision-making, this paper studies to build apricing decision theoretical system of telecommunication service, and pricing decisionmodels with considering a series of factors.Firstly, this paper studies the pricing model of the telecommunication monopolyservice. In the condition of operator’s network capacity unlimited, build the enterprisesprofit function model based on two-part pricing, solve the optimal pricing decision.Further, In the condition of operator’s network capacity limited, build the enterprisesprofit function model under constraints, solve the optimal pricing decision, and discussthe impact of network capacity limited for operators’ pricing decisions and profits. Thestudy shows that: the network capacity limited will lead to increased optimal pricing,and lower operators’ profits.On this basis, this paper studies the pricing model of the telecommunicationscompetitive service. In the first stage of user into network, build a duopoly profitfunction model, solve the equilibrium pricing decision; In the second stage of user toselect a network, build the operators profit function model under the transfer costconstraints, solve the optimal pricing decision, and discuss the impact of the behavior ofusers for operators’ pricing decision. The study shows that: in the first stage, duopoly operators’ equilibrium pricing exists and is unique; in the second stage, operatorsre-pricing or not depends on the transfer cost of users, and users’ per capitaconsumption has a direct impact on the pricing decision.