Empirical Research On Influence Of Major Shareholders Control To Equity Incentive Effect

Up to2013,55companies have implemented the equity incentive.Equity incentive has become important measures of a listed company owners on Executive Incentive.Foreign study concluded that incentive and company performance positively correlated,however China is no clear conclusions and some studies even explain the relationship between the two is invalid.Based on cause analysis, China equity concentrated than foreign Country’s,and China’s largest shareholder holding36%of the average.Dominance is serious.Considered separately the relationship of equity incentive effect and firm performance, regardless of other factors, researchers do not have practical significance.Through theoretical analysis shows that equity incentives are implemented by the environmental impact of corporate governance, and major shareholder control is widespread in chinese corporate governance environment.From the perspective of corporate governance environment, especially the perspective of major shareholder,the researchon the reasons for poor equity incentive effect thathave theoretical and practical significance.It provides a reference,when a listed company using the equity incentive planbuild appropriate corporate governance environmentfrom the perspective of a major shareholder control.This study by analyzing the contents of major shareholders on the role of managers, focuses on whether control of major shareholders effects on managers’equity incentive andimpact on the performance of the equity incentive effectin different equity nature and different growth companies. Studies use SPSS16.0analysis software empirical analysis.Research yielded some results.Firstly,regardless of the big shareholder control, with the increase in the proportion of management shareholding, company’s performance increase. Secondly, when major shareholding ratio is above50%, with the increase in the proportion of the largest shareholder, managers equityincentiveis less effective or ineffective.Thirdly,when major shareholding ratio is above50%, with the increase in the proportion of the largest shareholder, managers equityincentive is enhanced.Fourthly,in the state-owned listed companies, with the increase in the proportion of the largest shareholder,equity incentive effect is enhanced.Fifthly,in the private holding listed companies, with the increase in the proportion of the largest shareholder, equity incentive effect is weakened. Sixthly,high-tech enterprises and non-high-tech research results was not significant,and major shareholders’sperformanceon equity incentive that impact by the company’s growth could not be verified.Finally, from the regulation and supervision of major shareholders and management behavior, this paper presents policy recommendations. From the perspective of corporate governance environment,the research give the reasons for poor equity incentive effect.It provides a theoretical basisfor a listed company using the equity incentive plan to build appropriate corporate governance environment from the perspective of a major shareholder control.