A Study On Rent Dissipation In The Chinese Current Land Acquisition System

Chinese current land requisition system formed in the planned economy and itadapted to the economic and social development in a certain historical period. In thebackground of urbanization, the land is awakened gradually as sleeping capital and thevalue of its assets is increasingly highlighted, so land features of function changes fromprotection to property. However, the land requisition system has failed to synchronize andit will inevitably produce institutional friction in this process, as a result, the value-addedbenefits of the land which belongs to the farmers produce a large number of rentdissipation, so the current land requisition system increasingly exposed the inadaptabilitywith the stage of economic development. The paper mainly uses institution evolutionanalysis and game theory to research the performance of rent dissipation in the currentland requisition system as well as the rental value of dissipate minimization method.Firstly, the paper analyses the game between the various stakeholders to show thedirect manifestations of rent dissipation, namely, negative-sum game between the variousstakeholders, that is all stakeholders failed to get all potential revenue generated by land inthe current land requisition system. Secondly the paper illustrates the indirectmanifestations of the rent dissipation by government price controls, the social protectionof the land value remained in the public domain as well as the weakening of propertyrights. Finally the paper puts forwards the viewpoint that what the interests of farmersdamaged is not only the allocation problem but also is the land rent dissipation problem inthe land acquisition process.Rent dissipation is social welfare loss and economic waste. Therefore, rentdissipation of the land value minimization approach is another problem to be studied inthis paper. As land features of function changes from protection to property and the currentland requisition system has failed synchronization, it causes friction of the system and rentdissipation. So the key to problem is that the land expropriation system change. In order to be consistent with this feature of the property of the land, this paper thinks that increasingfarmers’ property income is essential in the land requisition system changes. Meanwhile,the comparison between Chinese and Japanese farmers’ property income illustrates thatincreasing Chinese farmers’ property income is very necessary...