A Research On Capital Investment Efficiency For The Chinese Stated-Owned Listed Companies

Capital as one of the basic elements of influence national economy steady growth, the efficiency of capital investment has attracted much attention of society from all walks of life. Especially for China, in contrast to other factors which can affect the growth of national economy, capital is not very abundant. From the perspective of the existing research results, high investment, high consumption, as well as low efficiency of resource utilization are the main way to China’s economic growth. It is conceivable that China’s capital investment efficiency does not achieve the optimal state. Therefore, how to improve the investment efficiency of capital became a hot issue of society from all walks of life concern and research. In this paper, taking China’s state-owned listed companies as the research target, we explore the efficiency of capital investment of China’s state-owned listed companies from the perspective of the investment-cash flow sensitivity.Learn from the efficiency of domestic and foreign capital investment and based on the research achievements of investment-cash flow sensitivity, using econometrics empirical research method of combining with normative research method, we has carried on the empirical study of capital investment efficiency of state-owned listed companies in China based on the perspective of investment-cash flow sensitivity.From the perspective of investment-cash flow sensitivity, the efficiency of capital investment of China’s state-owned listed companies is researched in this paper by selecting Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange listed manufacturing companies from2002to2011. Firstly, through the analysis of the whole samples, we find whether there is investment-cash flow sensitivity in China’s state-owned listed companies. Secondly, if there is a significant investment-cash flow sensitivity of the full sample data test results showed in China’s state-owned listed companies, it can be inferred that the efficiency of capital investment of China’s state-owned listed companies is not optimal state. Further from three aspects of financing constraints, agency conflicts and management overconfidence, we have explored the real reason that the efficiency of capital investment is not optimal in China’s state-owned listed companies. Finally, through empirical analysis, we find the agency conflict is the reason that the efficiency of capital investment is not optimal in China’s state-owned listed companies.