| After the financial crisis, China’s economy started to slow down the pace of development, the way of the development also starts to change. As an important part of the market economy, whether the enterprises can make right decisions and improve the investment efficiency is becoming more and more crucial. This paper studies the impact of financing constrains and agency conflicts on the investment efficiency. We hope this paper can draw the attention of policy makers, shareholders, creditors and managers, and measures can be made to relieve the adverse effects of financing constrains and agency conflicts. Through the empirical research on the manufacturing listed companies from 2011 to 2013, this paper studies the impact of financing constrains and agency conflicts on the investment efficiency, and provides suggestions for economy’s smooth transition and healthy development.After the empirical study, we find the following conclusions. Increasing the company size can significantly improve its investment efficiency, and the enterprises with a longer listed time often invest less. Contrary to our expectations, the phenomenon of Analysts follow-up didn’t increase the investment efficiency but aggravated the extent of under-investment. From the perspective of agency conflicts, we also find several conclusions. It often aggravates the extent of over-investment if the chairman and the CEO are the same person, it also happens when the Managerial ownership is large. Besides, we also find that increasing the separation can effectively decrease the extent of under-investment.Although the financing constraints and agency conflicts can both decrease the efficiency of investment, but after further study, we find the financing constrains has more restrictions on the investment efficiency, especially in the sample of the under-investment enterprise. As a conclusion, financing constraints can account for the low investment efficiency of the manufacturing industry better. |
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