The Research On The Capital Structure Of The Chinese State-owned Enterprises Based On The New Institutional Economics

With the joint-stock reform of state-owned enterprises, and the implementation ofdebt-equity swap and the state-owned shares held less, the reform of state-owned enterprises inChina has made some achievements. And the investment and financing structure of thestate-owned enterprises has also been improved. Although it has made some achievements butthe effect is not big because of the deeper systemic or institutional reasons of State-ownedenterprises. As the main body of the state-owned economy, the state-owned enterprises play animportant role on promoting the development of the national economy continuously, rapidly andhealthily. The reform of state-owned enterprises has been the focus of China’s economic reformand it is also the difficulty. Financing behavior of state-owned enterprises as the core of thereform and development of the state-owned enterprises is more important and more difficult.Therefore study the capital structure of state-owned enterprises in China has a very greattheoretical and practical significance.The new institutional economics is a modern rising economics discipline. It contains thetheories of transaction costs, property rights, contract, agency, institutional change and so on. Itwill produce unexpected results when used to guide and analyze the capital structure ofstate-owned enterprises. In this paper, I will analyze the historical changes and current situationof the capital structure of state-owned enterprises in China deeply using the theories and methodsof the new institutional economics, and combined with Western capital structure theory. Then Iwill fully reveal the problems and the reasons of the capital structure of state-owned enterprisesin China. Thus get inspiration from it and put forward relevant countermeasures to optimize thecapital structure of state-owned enterprises in China. As the research methods, I will use theanalysis framework of the new institutional economics, the combination of normative analysismethod and descriptive research method and the combination historical analysis method andlogical inductive method of combining the deductive method.The paper is divided into five chapters, each part of the content is as follows: The firstchapter is the introduction, elaborating the research background, significance and purpose of thispaper and the literature review of domestic and international capital structure theory; The second chapter is the theoretical review of the New Institutional Economics, elaborating the study objectof the New Institutional Economics——system, the basic theory of the New InstitutionalEconomics——transaction costs theory, the core theory of the New Institutional Economics——property rights theory, contract theory and the principal-agent theory. These will do sometheoretical matting for discussion later; The third chapter will analyze the changes and currentsituation of China’s state-owned enterprises from the perspective of the New InstitutionalEconomics, including the capital structure of state-owned enterprises transition from financialallocation to bank loans and from bank loans to diversified financing mode, and the problem oflack of internal financing, dependence on bank financing and equity financing preference. Then Iwill point out the deep-seated causes of these problems and the capital structure changes; Thefourth chapter proposes appropriate countermeasures to optimize the capital structure ofstate-owned enterprises. This guides by the results of the analysis of the third chapter, and findsout the solution to the problem of the capital structure of state-owned enterprises from the pointof view of the New Institutional Economics. And put forward the following countermeasures:First, improve the financing environment of the state-owned enterprises from the system; Second,clear property rights of state-owned enterprises and establish a diversified ownership structure;Third, deepen the reform of the financial system and Harden the debt contract constraint instate-owned enterprises; Last, improve the corporate governance structure of state-ownedenterprises and reduce the adverse impact of the separation of control, residual claims andmanagement which cause of the principal-agent.