Failure And Governance Based On Game Analysis Of Real Estate Regulation

China’s real estate market in just a few decades of development has made certain achievements, however, there have been a series of problems to be solved. The central government’s regulatory policies have been constantly improved with the transformation of the market environment, showing the status quo of control objectives multidimensional,diversification of regulatory tools, and policy efforts growing wider. Central control policies, however, have not achieved tangible results. Before2011, house prices continued to rise even in the case of real estate control intensified,since the second half of2011, while the control has achieved a certain effect, but the effect’s persistent and stability needs to be strengthened. Be seen that the main problems of the regulation of China’s real estate is in the process of policy implementation failure, rather than the lack of policy supply or control efforts. Therefore, the most important thing currently is to solve the problems in the policy implementation.Starting from looking for the root of control failure, place the major stakeholders involved in China’s real estate control policy implementation process in the interests mechanism, to explore the environment and the status of the various interest groups in the process of real estate control, as well as their respective roles and behavior, and to analysis the various interest groups’behavioral characteristics under different constraints, and how these behavioral characteristics affects the regulatory effects. The analysts believe that there are three main reasons as follows:Between the local government and the Central Government there is a interests Game because of the imperfect oversight mechanisms and decentralization system; Developers sent a rent-seeking collusion with local governments and start a Price Game with consumer because of the imperfect supervision mechanism and market information asymmetry; The Price Game between the consumers because of their irrational expectations,are the main reasons for the ineffective regulation of China’s real estate.Focusing on the three main reasons, this thesis constructs correlative governance models to present an analysis by means of Nash equilibrium, reciprocal fairness and Option Game theory. From the establishment and equilibrium analysis of the game, how to sent a effective incentive and restraint on the behaviors of local government, real estate developers and consumers,is the key to governance the control failure.Finally, from the conclusion of the analysis, seek countermeasures to strengthen the effect of real estate control. Finding that only by develop a effective incentive and restraint mechanisms, improve the mechanism of the real estate market and so on, the failure of the real estate regulation can be avoided to a certain extent, so as to promote the healthy development of the whole real estate market.