An Empirical Study Of Listed Bank Ownership Structure And Governance Risk Relationships

With the development of China’s market economy, commercial banks play an increasingly important role in national economic development. They not only play an role in promoting our country economic development, but also play an irreplaceable role for maintenance of the entire economic stability and implementation of national political aspirations. China’s commercial banks are developed from a planned economic background, with the establishment of the market economy and joint-stock reform and listing of shares, and gradually evolved into commercial banks as the guide of the market economy, the shareholding structure is the best proof of its in changes.This paper mainly studies the shareholding structure’s influence on risk management of China’s commercial banks after banks’IPO. Firstly, This paper researches the shareholding structure on the impact of risk management from two aspects:the shareholding structure concentration and the nature of shareholders. And consider that relatively concentrated shareholding structure is more helpful to control the governance risk of commercial banks, that higher proportion of state-owned shares is not conducive to reducing the governance risk of commercial banks, the introduction of certain foreign shares have a positive impact on the control of commercial bank governance risks. Secondly, on the basis of the oretical research, This paper usese descriptive statistics to analy and evalue for shareholding structure and governance risk of China’s listed commercial banks in order to find flaws and shortcomings of their existence. Finaly, on the basis of previous studies and combining with the characteristics of China’s commercial banks, This paper builds shareholding structure and governance risk indicators index, use the2007-2012panel data of our14listed commercial banks, and builds panel data model to empirical research and analyze the impact of China’s listed commercial banks’shareholding structure on manage risks.The empirical results show that:the largest shareholding structure concentration and stake of control show a positive relationship to governance risk, the shareholding ratio and the square ratio in the top five shareholders is negative correlation to governance risks; The state-owned shares ratio in the top five shareholders are positive to governance risks, state-owned legal ratio, general domestic ratio and foreign corporate ownership percentage is negatively correlate to governance risks. Finaly, based on empirical conclusions and reality, this paper proposes countermeasures to optimization shareholding structure at the present stage.