| China and Japan suffered some several disasters recent years, which greatly damaged the operating of some large-scale operation systems. For example, South China suffered a disaster of severe ice and snow in2008, which caused record power outages, and Fukushima accident nearly made Tokyo electric power collapsed, et al. Obviously, emergency measures of those systems are invalid, which Seriously deviate from the established plan, and the limited rational behaviors of managers play key roles in this process. By conducting a questionnaire survey, this article found that overconfidence, ambiguity aversion and status-seeking have significant impacts on managers’ emergency decision. So this article focused on "How managers’ overconfidence, ambiguity aversion and status-seeking impact the recovery of disrupted systems", specifically,Firstly, overconfidence is witnessed when manager makes decision during disruption by taking a field survey on a Power Grid Company. In this part, a newsvendor model is presented to investigate the decision bias when manager acts in over-estimate and over-precise manner, of course under the scenario of critical capacity injured by unexpected events, as well as the calibration function of penalty and subsidy in adjusting the decision bias. Results indicate that increasing penalty on capacity shortage and subsiding to cut down recovery process would be helpful to amend the decision bias while lower the operation cost. Recovery decision bias may present positive or negative trends when manager behave over-precisely, but this bias could be calibrated by adjusting the ratio of penalty and subsidy, that means over-precision behavior might do contributions to make operation performance better. However, over-estimation behavior will suppress the decision bias when manager act over-precisely at the same time, which means less recovery decision and failure of penalty and subsidy must be the truth. Lastly, highly attention should be paid to the left-skewed distribution of random disturbance on recovery, and manager should add a little more quantities on recovery decision when he makes decision according to the newsvendor problem.Secondly, this part focuses on the manager’s ambiguity aversion behavior in the disruption management. Ambiguity of the decision environment is a feature of emergency situations, so managers need decide how to repair the damaged operation capacities under ambiguity circumstances. Based on NAC theory, this part analyzed relationships between the degree of ambiguity (which called knight uncertain either), the degree of optimism towards ambiguity, and decision-making bias. We found that the emergency input level in the ambiguity case will be higher than that of non-fuzzy case, and this deviation is related not only with ambiguity degree, but also with managers’attitudes toward ambiguity.Lastly, this part focuses on the manager’s status seeking behavior in the disruption management. Through field investigation and interview of an electric power corporation, we discover the manager might pursue3kinds of status during disruption management, which are political, team and social status. And we also presents a mathematic model and numerical simulation in order to find out whether the manager’s status seeking behavior would deviate the decision making, and further affects the effectiveness of disruption management. Conclusions drawn in our research show that, firstly, status seeking behavior will obviously cause deviation in decision making in disruptions and correspondingly the wastes inevitably take place, and interestingly, the punishment from supervision department might be further boost the wastes. Secondly, the politician-type and practical-type managers contribute the same in disruption management, however, in the view of catastrophe-preparations, the practical-type manager shows better in operation performance. Thirdly, the more important of manager’s effort in team, the better and more stable performance of disruption management will be attained. |
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