Ownership Structure And The Relationship With The Agency Costs

From the current research situation at home and abroad, research on agency cost primarily exists two frameworks:on the one hand,in the case of a highly dispersed equity, how to control agency cost caused by the conflict of interest between shareholders and management, mainly used in a handful of countries such as Britain and the United States; on the one hand, under the condition of relatively concentrated equity, how to control agency cost caused by the conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, and is mainly used in most countries in the world. According to agency theory, agency cost can be divided into the first kind agent cost caused by conflicts of interest between shareholders and management and the second agency cost caused by conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. These two kinds of agency cost coexist in the listed companies in our country, and at present most of the research literature separately research the first kind agent cost or the second kind agent cost, there are few researches about two kinds of agent cost combined for research comparison after equity division reform, So in this paper, on the basis of predecessors’ research and the perspective of being finished of equity division reform, separately to take the listed companies on shenzhen main board and the listed companies on GEM as research samples in order to study comprehensively the effect between ownership structure and equity agency cost, The empirical results of this paper is as follows:ownership concentration will contribute to decrease two kinds of agency cost; with the improvement of equity degree of balance, to a certain extent, the first kind of agency cost can be improved,the second kind of agency cost can be reduced; institutional investors did not play a proper role.