A Game Theoretical Model Of Passenger Traffic Sharing Among Different Modes Of Transport In Comprehensive Transportation Corridor

Merits of the development of the transport industry directly affects the speed ofeconomic development.Building green, coordinated, efficient and integrated transport systemis the inevitable trend of development of China’s transportation industry. Comprehensivetransportation corridor is an important component in the form of a national transportationsystem, with the increasing sound channel within an integrated transport infrastructure, theintegrated transport transportation corridors increasingly common phenomenon of coexistence,competition between different modes of transport intercity intensified. Based on the analysisof the present status of the integrated transport channels at home and abroad, under thevarious modes of transport within the channel background of fierce competition for passengertransport system and integrated passenger transport within the channel sharing factors areanalyzed in order to build a passenger-sharing game model between modes of transport, forinstance through the calculation of Lanzhou-Xi’an passenger verify the effectiveness of themodel.In this thesis, first of all, analyzed the comprehensive passenger transport channels in thesystem, the concept and classification of the comprehensive transport corridor are describedbriefly, and analyzes the railways, highways and civil aviation three high-speed economic andtechnical characteristics of the mode of transportation, and the present problems of the threekinds of high-speed transportation mode, and gives relevant countermeasures, at the sametime, the effect factors of comprehensive transport corridor efficient coordination is analyzed.Secondly, Analysised on differences in factors from the supply of transport, passengerdemand determinants and external environmental factors on three aspects of the passengermarket consolidated passenger transport channel sharing situation, researched and identifiedutility function of the passenger for transport way, and gives the calculated way to each index.And then, in this thesis,it establishes a Steinberg double game model according to thecompetition and collaboration of various transportation ways. In the superstratum of themodel, it concentrates the game of operator. It regards the ticket price strategy made byoperator as the decision variables and the operator’s economic benefit maximization isconsidered as the upper objective. In the substratum of the model, it concentrates the gamebetween passengers and operators and it also regards the ticket price strategy made byoperator as the decision variables, but its lower objective is the maximization of utility value of different utility value for the passengers. When the ticket price which satisfies the upperoperator is close extremely to the ticket price which satisfies the lower passengers afterrepeated gaming between operators and passengers of various transportation styles, the gamereaches a kind of balanced state. When it is in the state of equilibrium,the generalized travelutility value reaches the maximum. At the same time, the benefit of various transportationstyle can reach the maximum together. It is caused by passenger flow volume which isdecided by the passengers’utility value of various transportation style. When the game reachesequilibrium, operators of various transportation style can not make more benefits by changingticket price. The result is that the passenger flow volume has reached maximum. The state ofbalance is a kind of optimal reaction between different traffic participants. The sharing rate ofpassenger flow, which belongs to the balanced state of various transportation style in thetraffic system, is the result of multi-stage evolution. According to the process of the wholegame, in this thesis, it offers a kind of algorithm named MSAused to solve this model.Finally, it chooses three kinds of transportation style from railway, highway and civilaviation. And it calculates out quantitative values of economic and technical characteristicsabout these transportation styles based on the average value of passengers’ traveling time.Under the condition of the competition among three kinds of transportation styles, it alsostudies the sharing game model of passenger flow, which regards different ticket strategies asthe decisive variables offered by operators of various transportation styles. In this paper, ituses the Matlab to write the algorithm program used to resolve the model. After operating theprogram, it obtains the result of passenger flow share under the balanced state of game, and italso draws the curve graph of convergence about the algorithm of MSA. It checked theeffectiveness of the model and algorithm. According to the analysis of passenger flow sharingresults about three kinds of transportation styles, it offers some suggests. At the same time, itprovide theoretical reference for the rational competition and harmonious developmentamong various transportation styles in the comprehensive transportation system.