The Effect Of Rule Preference On Cooperative Investment

This thesis focuses on the effect of rule preference on cooperative investment based on the theory of social preferences in combination with the increases of individual cooperative investments. The problem was analyzed from two aspects:theory and empirical analysis.The utility model of cooperation behavior, effect mechanism of rule effect on cooperative investment and the measurement of cooperation level were discussed and hypotheses were put forward. Based on public goods experiments, cooperation level was measured and by setting two rules for subjects to buy, the amount of coins subjects bought represented for rule preference level.Conclusions can be drawn as following:First, an individual has rule preferences, which is largely based on the instinct preference to this kind of rule instead of material benefits. Rule preferences vary with different individuals. Second, the higher level of rule preferences, the higher level of cooperative investment. Third, subjects invested more in the rule scene which they preferred then in the rule scene which they didn’t.Fourth, the subjects who preferred agreement by consultation invested more than the subjects who preferred regulation by authority. Fifth, if subjects with different rule preferences were included in the same group(That means all subjects, no matter which rule they preferred, were randomly assigned to one rule scene.), their cooperative investment level was lower, compared with subjects who were assigned with same rule preference cooperators. Finally, the correlation between whether consultation process and each subject’s actual investmental coins were known by each teammate or not and the cooperative investment level is not yet clear.