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Study On Collective Negotiation Action In Union With Members Under The Condition Of Heterogeneity

Posted on:2015-06-07Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Q H SunFull Text:PDF
GTID:2296330422988655Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
As an important organization protecting the basic rights of workers, Trade union hasbeen plays a key role in relieve the contradictions and disputes between workers andenterprises. Its main means is through collective bargaining negotiations with the enterprise.As the main members involved in the collective action, their individual differences betweenunion members on the impact of collective bargaining action has become a focus in thestudy of this article.First of all, this paper has a game analysis between trade unions and enterprises. Basedon bargaining theory, select wage and employment as negotiating variables, and set up acollective bargaining game model of cooperation with same members in union. Come to theconclusion: in an imperfectly competitive labor market, the Nash equilibrium is on thecontract curve. But the change of union utility depends on the bargaining power of the union.In general, as long as the union has the bargaining power, the wages and employment ofmembers will be increase. Considering the union contains members on different productivity,this paper adds the heterogeneity variables to the original collective bargaining model. Atthe same time, draw the conclusion: collective bargaining tends to offer the same salarylevel, thus improve the wages of the workers with low productivity.Secondly, on the basis of the research, this paper discusses individual heterogeneityhow to effects the collective action of union. This paper chooses the individual supplytechnology level and the degree of positive as the variables of heterogeneity and set upindividual utility model. The research result shows that supply of the collective bargainingof a individual member are affected by the supply technology level and the degree ofpositive when aggregate supply of other members to collective bargaining are fixed. Thetwo variables are changed in direct proportion to each other. That is, when a individualmember takes part in collective bargaining, the member with higher supply technologicallevel will be more positive to promote the success of collective bargaining, must pays moreefforts to guarantee collective action succeed, while member with lower supplytechnological level tend to be lazy, they do not seem to be conducive to contribute to thesuccess of collective bargaining.Finally, combined with the research model, this paper chooses three successfulcollective bargaining action cases and carries on further analysis and research, verifies theconclusions of the model.
Keywords/Search Tags:Individual heterogeneity, union, Collective bargaining, Game theory
PDF Full Text Request
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