The Study On The Subject Supervision Of Food Safety In China-in The View Of Principal-agent Theory

From the regulation design point of view, China’s food safety regulatory system is a subject of the public interest theory of regulation which uses to explain and defend. The public interest theory of regulation seen the government like a man who is kind-hearten and do every thing possible. This view reflected the design of the system which is the lack of incentives for law-executor and weak supervision. Lax enforcement of food safety regulator is the best interpretation of the status quo. From the perspective of economics, China’s food safety department just consider the agent to the citizen. From the perspective of principle-agent theory to the relationship between citizen and government, the objective is different. If you do not participate in the constraint from the system level to solve two fundamental problems and incentive compatibility, you can not reduce or eliminate food safety supervision department of "adverse selection" and "moral hazard" behavior. Based on in-depth analysis of China’s food safety supervisions which is lack of enforce and the real institutional roots. it is recommended to the perspective of principle-agent theory replace public interest theory of regulation. In order to prevent the main body of "adverse selection" and "moral hazard" behavior in China’s food safety mark. Addition to the introduction of this article is divided into five parts:Introduction: this paper seeks to clarify the background, review research purpose and significance.The first part of article:examine the status quot of China’s food safety regulation enforcement. Many real food safety incidents reflect to the weak supervision and lazy executor.Objective to analyze the problem and provide evidence for this article view.The second part of article: the theoretical basis of our food safety regulatory body system.The department of China’s food safety is an exponent and adherent of he public interest theory of regulation.This theory think about law enforcement is kindest hearts and best do everything he can.Just forget the feature which he will calculate the results.Lack of incentive mechanism and constants mechanism will make the pheromone of not eager to participate to conduct supervision over enforcement.The third part of article: the better theory which design the department of food safety in China should choose.In the view of economic,citizen and department of food just like the relationship principal with agent.There are many advantages of principle-agent theory.For example,he admit the“economic man”,the object function is different between principle and agent.Then put the incentive mechanism and constant mechanism into the design of system of department of food safety in China.It will help to solve several problems.Such as,there is no principal, lots of agents,the information between principle and agent is not the same.These problem make agent to do“reverse option”and“moral hazard”behavior.So,we should choose the principle-agent theory to design the system of department of food safety in China.The fourth part of article: experience of abroad foreign countries to solve the problem of principal- agent relationship. Canada, USA, UK who constituted a system of change information,integrate the right of the department of food safety in these country,improve the level of income for the agents to sole the problem like information asymmetry,lack of incentive mechanism.These experiences will help us to improve the stander of law enforcement.The fifth part of article: using principal-agent theory to improve the stander of law enforcement in China. Public Interest Litigation, improve law enforcement personnel for promotion mechanism will resolve the problem like lack of less incentive,no principal, lots of agents and others.In order to reduce the chance to make the law enforcement become to weakly in supervision.