Research On Corruption Of Local Officials In The Officials Incentive Perspective

Since the reform and opening up, Chinese economy experienced rapid growth fora long time, with an average annual growth rate of about9.8%, ranking the forefrontof the world. Some scholars have pointed out, to promote China’s rapid economicdevelopment power, no power to produce energy than "incentive". Now more andmore scholars have realized that, the important reason of China economicdevelopment is that the "incentive" problem, namely what we often say "competitionfor growth". Specifically, is a series of officials to China’s implementation of the localcadres and personnel system reform and fiscal decentralization system reform as therepresentative of the incentive mechanism, which is a good solution to the imbalanceproblem of our country political centralization and fiscal decentralization brings, anda good foundation for the rapid development of China’s economy to play. But on theother hand, with China’s rapid economic development there is a serious problem--theproblem of corruption, according to the investigation report on "TransparencyInternational" display, our country has been at the level of corruption is serious amongcountries since the90’s of the last century. If the incentive mechanism and theproblem of corruption of consideration, local government officials "role" is verysubtle: the subject they are incentive mechanism, is also the subject of corruptioncrime. Then, local officials incentive mechanism and whether there is any relationshipbetween the official corruption? Or say, local officials incentive mechanism will havean impact on official corruption?Therefore, this paper from the perspective of official incentive mechanismstudies its effect on the problem of official corruption. Firstly, We introduces thecurrent situation of corruption of our country and also sort out the reform and openingup of China’s major officials incentive mechanism, we can see that since the90’s of20th century China carried out a series of reforms about local fiscal revenue and theappointment and removal of local officials, at the same time the problem of corruptionin our country also year by year deterioration. Then, according to the existing theory,detailed analysis of China’s official incentive mechanism for the effects of corruptionof local officials, we also build a model based on the number of official promotiontournament mechanism and corrupt motivation, mathematical analysis of the problem.Then, we do the empirical test according to the2000~2007panel data of25provincesin308cities, the empirical results show that, China’s official incentive mechanism worsens the problem of corruption of local officials in a certain extent. Finally, basisthe analysis of the theoretical and empirical research, this paper proposedoptimization adjustment of our country at the present stage of official incentivemechanism, in order to improve the existing incentive mechanism and promotinghealthy economic development objective.