Service Cooperation Policy In A Dual-channel Supply Chain Under Service Different

The focus of enterprises competition has gradually shifted from product to servicewith the maturing of the market development, such as the excellent service of logistics,delivery, return and maintenance and so on. Service is not only the core competitiveness,but also is another import tool that maintain market share in the new economicenvironment. The competition and cooperation of the dual-channel supply chain causingscholars and business concerns.Use of economic, management science, optimization and game theory, a servicecollaboration decision problem in a dual-channel supply chain is studied with theservice level and the customer’s acceptance of the Internet channel is taking intoconsideration. The decision is studied for settings that the retailer provides same servicelevel in both channels or not and incentive mechanism about service effort provided bythe manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain is studied under asymmetricinformation. The Stackelberg decentralized decision model, centralized decision modeland principal-anent models are developed, and the optimal fixed payment and theoptimal profit sharing ratio are obtained.The conclusion implies that the system profits, the manufacturer’s optimal profitand retailer’s optimal profit are always higher when different service is provided thanthe same service, and the optimal service level for the direct channel is a little lowerthan that for the traditional channel under decentralized mode. Additional, themanufacturer’s profit decreases under asymmetric information, the retailer’s profit keepsame even lower service level is provided. Thus, the system performance of the supplychain decreases.