Research On The Influence Of The Media Attention On The Relationship Between The Management Shareholding And The Enterprise Value

Factors that affect enterprise value should not only include the enterprise internal governance mechanism, also the external governance mechanism should be taken into account. In modern society, people get the information they need with the help of newspapers, television, radio, Internet and other media. The media plays an intermediary role of gathering information and disseminating it to the public, and it have become the inseparable part of People’s Daily life. Media supervision as an important way of external corporate governance mechanism, is becoming a hot spot of academic circles at home and abroad research recently, and it have aroused the concern of the China securities regulatory commission.As the tool of information transmission in modern society, media not only helps reduce the problem of corporate governance, and also realize and strengthen the influence of interest groups and social norms on corporate governance. Therefore, the corporate governance effect of media attention has important significance to protect the interests of investors and promote the sound development of socialist market economy. How to utilize the effect of corporate governance of media attention much better in China?In this paper, we choose China’s734listed companies from2010to2012as samples to research the relationship between the management shareholding and the volatility of enterprise value. Then we add the regulation of media attention on the basis of the relationship. At the same time, this article will divide the management ownership into three parts according to the movements of the relationship between the management shareholding and the enterprise value:high management equity group, middle management equity group and low management equity group, in order to compare the media governance effect in management shareholding height differences in different situations. Through empirical research, we found that there is an obvious correlation and interval effect between the management shareholding and the listed companies’ value. We also found that in the high management equity group, the influence is stronger.