The Resigning Of Senior Executive Of GEM: Performance Influence Or Temptation Of Cash?

This paper studies the deep-seated causes of turnover behavior GEM ListingCorporation executives in China, analysis of enterprise performance and the reductionof these two factors are the main influencing factors of cash. For holding executives,two different effects on top management turnover behavior. The data sample for ourgem opening date to the end of2010all listing Corporation. Combined with the statusquo in China, according to executives is holding this grouping variables on the sample,whether the executive is holding case executives affects the turnover behavior factorswould be different. Through the establishment of Logistic regression model to test thecorrelation between executive turnover and performance, the conclusion is that for notholding executive turnover of the company, company performance and top managerturnover behavior significantly negatively correlated; while for holding executivesleave the company, contrary to the conclusion. In order to study the reduction ofholding executives relationship between motivation and turnover behavior of the two,this article innovative introduction of managerial ownership and market value of thecompensation ratio as the intermediate variables, through the correlation test ofexecutive stock market/pay this variable and top management turnover behavior ofthe Logistic regression model, significant positive correlation test results for two;further the stock turnover executives in the lock up period after the cash holdingsbehavior was studied, a conclusion that the stock market/compensation and CashHoldings Behavior positive correlation, which proves the positive correlation betweencash due to holding executive turnover behavior and reducing, explained to reduce theinfluence factors of cash holding executive turnover. Finally, this paper argues forshare turnover executives, when an executive stock market and compensation of therelatively large, to reduce the impact of cash motivated to operating performance onexecutive turnover. One of the innovations of this paper is to do poineering workboard executive turnover behavior of two cases divided according to whether the ownership, the innovation of the two is the introduction of managerial ownership andmarket value of the compensation ratio of this variable, to verify the correlationholding executive turnover behavior held at behavior and reduced indirectly throughthis variable. The innovation of the three executives list is by disclosure of annualreports and the annual report last year compared to confirm whether the executiveturnover, the data relative to other studies of senior departures to collect morecomprehensive, complete. China’s gem by the listing Corporation, at the expiration ofthe term of office of a larger proportion of the outgoing executive, who had by generaloutgoing to cover turnover intention, should arouse the public attention.