| In China, family enterprise is an important part of our economic system. Because of its own advantages, such as the flexibility of controlling, decision-making, many family enterprises have developed rapidly since they were established. Now, some of the family enterprises have obtained the listing qualifications by issuing or backdoor listing. At present, the family enterprise has become an important part of the securities market in our country, which will promote the development of China’s economy.Since the family enterprise has made great contribution to our economy, while it is always affected by the business mode, so it is necessary to pay attention to its business mode. In general, the family enterprise has two management mode, namely the family business and non-family business. The family business is commonly used by most family enterprise. Because the family business is more flexible and the controller can make centralized decision-making, which will improve the efficiency of enterprise. However, with the development of family enterprise, the family enterprise will face many problems, such as the lack of talent, management experience, information and so on. Therefore, introduction of occupation managers is an inevitable choice of family enterprises. Only after the introduction of excellent occupation managers, can the family enterprise list and enhance its value. It means that family enterprises need to gradually transform, namely from the family business to the non-family business. However, when the family enterprises introduce the occupation managers, the goal is not completely consistent between the occupation manager and the actual controller. According to the principal-agent theory, due to the problem of asymmetric information, moral hazard and risk preferences, occupation managers are likely to own their benefit and harm the benefit of the business owner. Therefore, it is necessary to carry out the effective incentive of occupation managers to make sure that executives’ goals are consistent with company’s goals. At present, there are two kinds of incentives to family enterprises, including salary and promotion. As everyone knows, as to the successor of family enterprises, most entrepreneurs want their children, spouse or son to inherit the operations of business. Therefore, it is impossible for t family enterprises to use promotion to motivate the occupation executives, especially in the family business of family enterprises. As a result, the incentive between the occupation managers and executives are different, which will limit the promotion of occupation managers. But in order to avoid the adverse effects of this result, the actual controller of family enterprises may reconsider optimizing the incentive mechanism of enterprises. when the promotion is limited, the promotion is replaced of high salary to keep the occupation manager’s goal and the enterprise’s goal agreement.This paper is an investigation on effects of family enterprise model for executive compensation around this central task. In this paper, we choose the listed family enterprises as the object of our study. The data we used came from the CSMAR database of2009. We analyzed the effects of family enterprise model for executive compensation empirically. Finally, the arrangement for the content are as follows:The first part mainly explained the object, the innovation, as well as the mentality and the frame. Then, in the second part, the relevant research literature at home and abroad were reviewed. In order to provide theoretical basis for our research,in the third part, we analyzed these theories,including the principal-agent theory, the human capital theory and the corporate governance theory. In the fourth part, we constructed a corresponding model. On this basis, we used the listed family enterprises of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market as the object. We analyzed the effects of family enterprise model for executive compensation empirically. In the empirical part,firstly, we used OLS regression. Secondly, we used instrumental variables to control the homogeneity and used the2SLS regression. Thirdly we compared the results of OLS and2SLS. Furthermore, we used the Houseman test to demonstrate the endogenous. At last, as we thought, the existence of endogenous was true. In order to ensure the robustness of the results, we tested the effectiveness of instrumental variables. Finally the null hypothesis was rejected and the validity of this tool variable was confirmed. The fifth part was the summary and expectation of this dissertation. From the perspective of management mode of family enterprises, this paper first analyzed the effects of family enterprise model for executive compensation empirically. Based on this, we used the data of listed family enterprise of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market to demonstrate the effects of the effects of family enterprise model for executive compensation. Finally, we got the following conclusion:(1)The executive will have higher income under the family management mode and there is a certain substitutional relationship between compensation and promotion.(2)The changes of large shareholders are negatively correlated with executive compensation, which means that the change of large shareholders in family enterprise have an effect on executive compensation.(3)The income of executive and the corporate performance was not significant in family enterprises.(4) The executive compensation was positively related to and firm size.(5)The proportion of independent directors was negatively correlated with executive compensation.(6) Executive compensation is positively related to age.(7) Industry, area, position have great impact on executive compensation.In this paper, the salary of senior executive refers to each executive’s compensation. However, the salary of the top three directors or the three former executives were regarded as executive compensation in the previous study. Therefore, the contribution of this paper is that we provide a new research methods, which are not the same as the previous research and the research of this field are added. The conclusion of the study enriches the understanding from all walks of life on the family enterprises model and executive compensation. At the same time, we also provide new theoretical basis and reference in the formulating and improving the system of executive compensation and compensation incentive mechanism for family enterprises. |
PDF Full Text Request