Study On The Characteristics Of Control Rights Allocation And Efficiency Of Listed Family Firms In China

The family enterprise is an enterprise organization form first appeared in the historyof human civilization, it has always been an important force in the world economicarena.With the expansion of enterprise scale and market competition intensifies, more andmore family enterprises through the IPO and backdoor way to become listingCorporation.But with the rapid expansion of the number and the scale of the family listingCorporation, the defect of corporate governance has gradually emerged, The mostimportant of governance issues is——The family controlling shareholders with the superright of control deprive the interests of small shareholders. This problem has seriouslyhindered the development of family capital expansion, but also endanger the healthy andstable of development of the capital market Chinese.Therefore, this article from theperspective of control theory that the core of corporate governance departure, analysis therelationship between efficiency distribution characteristics and corporate control ofChinese family listing Corporation. Further exploring and perfecting the governancestructure of family of listing Corporation, countermeasures and measures to improvegovernance efficiency.This paper studies from the three-dimensional theory of control right, to study theconnotation of corporate control rights and its configuration characteristics and allocationefficiency family listing Corporation namely the right to vote, the3D configuration controlcontrol and management from the perspective of meeting. The family listing Corporationof the allocation of control rights and corporate efficiency as the theoretical and empiricalanalysis. The relationship between efficiency control characteristics and the company’smain analysis family listing Corporation, the influence of these three aspects of accessfeature implementation characteristics and family control of the family listing Corporationfamily master proportion characteristic, control of the family listing Corporation controlthe company efficiency, and from the second class of the perspective of the agency problem, to discuss non founding family listing Corporation (indirect listing) control rightallocation of the company, specifically to our family listing Corporation in2010to2012data as the sample, the use of statistical analysis software EVIEWS regression analysis.Empirical tests is also the conclusion of this article is, Chinese family listingCorporation family master ratio control effect on firm efficiency, indirect listed familylisting Corporation control efficiency of familial voting proportion and company arenegatively correlated, indirect listed family listing Corporation family directors proportionand company performance negatively related, indirect listed family company directly as ordesignated management positions and corporate performance negatively related; Chinesefamily listing Corporation control rights influence on efficiency of indirect listed familycompany, cash flow rights and voting rights and separation efficiency, negative correlationeffects; access to features on corporate efficiency of control over the family, companyefficiency is better than the direct listed family listing Corporation indirect listing familylisting Corporation. According to the above theory and empirical test show, control Chinafamily listing Corporation is highly concentrated in the controlling family, cause thecontrolling family against the interests of minor shareholders of listing Corporation, whichreduces the efficiency of corporate governance. The laws and regulations on the protectionof the rights of shareholders are not perfect, information disclosure irregularities and thebackwardness of the manager market is the main cause of our family listing Corporationcontrol right highly centralized, only to strengthen the construction of legal system toprotect shareholders’ rights in China, and actively cultivate manager market, to promote thefamily listing Corporation control rights rationally, improve governance structure thefamily of the listing Corporation, and ultimately improve the efficiency of corporategovernance.