The Research On Carbon Reduction Coordination Mechanism In A Single-supplier And Multi-manufacturer Supply Chain

The global emission reduction issue formed for the relief of greenhouse effect hasreached China. Under low-carbon economy, the high-energy-consumingmanufacturing enterprises have gradually felt the pressure of emission reduction, nomatter out of the government regulation or corporate social responsibility. As acritical link in the supply chain, the emission reduction result of ahigh-energy-consuming supplier can affect other partners’ profits. Therefore, it hassignificant theoretical and practical sense to consider the low-carbon optimizationproblem of the whole supply chain from the perspective of the up-and-downstreamcooperation.This dissertation was under a single-supplier and multi-manufacturer supplychain structure and mainly researched the enterprises’ profit functions consideringemission reduction cost and carbon trading, the emission reduction decision of amonopoly supplier, and the decisions of downstream enterprises when multi-oligarchparticipate in the emission reduction cooperation. It analyzed whether the emissionreduction alliance of a single-supplier and multi-manufacturer supply chain could bebuilt and analyzed the condition of the contract if it could, with the use of contractmechanism and model optimization theory.In the evolutionary game of the supplier’s emission reduction decision and themanufacture populations’ investment decision for it, considering the extra gain of thesupply chain brought by the high emission reduction rate, this dissertation analyzedthe effect on results of the evolutionary game of the emission reduction cost, theallocation proportion of the cost, the profit share proportion and the relationshipbetween the cost and revenue. The conditions under which the supplier would choosea high emission reduction rate and the manufacturer would invest for it was obtainedat last.In the supplier dominated supply chain, this dissertation compared three plans ofthe supplier respectively under the voluntary market and regulated market: noemission reduction, emission reduction independently, and emission reductionalliance with manufactures. It came to a conclude that the alliance could be built andmanufactures would bear certain proportions of the investment when the supplier chose its emission reduction rate per product and set the price discount and thecooperation contract.Meanwhile, in the research on the formation of emission reduction alliance, itrespectively discussed the cases under the identical manufactures and themanufactures different in production costs. When the price discount was related to themanufactures’ investment proportions, the production costs had no effects oninvestment proportions. The emission reduction cooperation could also be formedthrough the price discount contract.