Research On Two-order-penalty Contract For Retailer-dominant Supply Chain Based On CVaR

With the increasing of economy globalization and the continuousdevelopment of science and technology, the enterprise facing unprecedentedmarket environment, which lead the traditional competition between theenterprises turn to the supply chain. Meanwhile, with the fact that the marketdemand is highly uncertain and the product is required more customized, a lot ofthe decision makers turn to a stronger sense of risk aversion, they want to achievea balance between expectation profits and risk loss. Though, consider the riskattitude of participants on supply chain puts forward a new research subject basedon the traditional supply chain contract.In recent years, with the continuous development of productivity, the marketstructure has shifted from a seller’s market to a buyer’s. And with the continuousintegration of the retail industry, the control of the retail terminal ceaselessly,make the retailer become more and more important in the supply chain, evenoccupy in the dominant position.Based on the above research background, the mainly research of this paper is:base on the two-echelon supply chain which consisting of one retailer asStackelberg leader and one manufacture as followers, consider the risk attitude ofthe retailer and the manufacture which will affect the coordination of the supplychain. Through in-depth research of the related literature, using conditionalvalue-at-risk (CVaR) as the risk aversion measure tools as well as the two-order-penalty contract. The main research contents and the research resultsare as follows:(1) Summary the economic environment of supply chain risk, the marketposition changes of the retailers, the characteristics of electronic products.Carding and analyze the basic supply chain contract, supply chain risk measuringmodel and the game theory applies in the supply chain.(2) Analysis on both centralized and decentralized decision-making of therisk neutral supply chain, to verify the effectiveness of the two-order-penaltycontract. By setting the reasonable contract parameters, making the expectedprofit under the decentralized decision making to the global optimization andboth of the retailers and the suppliers to get Pareto optimality.(3) Comparatively analysis the profit for both the risk aversion and the riskneutral under centralized decision-making, get the result that the profit of thesupply chain is decreases with the degree of supply chain risk aversion, and theprofit of the risk aversion supply chain is always smaller than the risk neutral.Risk neutral supply chain is a special condition of the risk aversion.(4)Using Conditional Value-at-Risk measure model to analysis the degree ofthe risk aversion of the retailer and the manufacture under decentralizeddecision-making. The study shows that when the manufacture is risk aversion andthe retailer is risk neutral, or the retailer partially shift the stockout cost to themanufacture, the two-order-penalty can make the risk aversion supply chain reachthe global optimization; when the retail transfer all the stockout cost to themanufacture, the two-order-penalty contract can’t coordinate the supply chain.The purpose of this paper is to research the risk attitude to the influence ofthe global optimization of supply chain, get a certain theoretical basis for thedecision maker of the risk aversion supply chain.