Research Of Supply Chain Contract Coordination With The Retailer Having Different Risk Preferences

With the continuous economic development, technological advances, companies arefacing the internal environment and market environment has undergone unprecedentedchanges. Faced with this change, enterprise competition shifted from the competitionbetween enterprises to the competition between supply chain, and this transition alsofaced enormous challenges. Supply chain collaboration while participating enterpriseshave to consider in multiple marginalization: the supply chain involved in business as anindependent economic entity to maximize profits at the same time, making the overallsupply chain optimization target deviation; same time, the structure of complex supplychain network, unstable market conditions and individual risk attitudes, resulting in asupply chain when making decisions in the enterprise with a certain degree of riskappetite. Based on the above background, this paper based on the newsboy model undermean CVaR criteria, considered wholesale price contract model, revenue sharing contractand buy back contract model with the retailer has a different risk preferences, anddiscussed the supply chain coordination of the of these contracts model.In this paper, based on the newsboy model under mean CVaR criteria, respectively,in the wholesale price contract, revenue sharing contract and a buyback contract,constructed contract extension model based on mean-CVaR which can measure differentrisk preferences of retailer, and studied the conditions which made the contract model ofsupply chain to achieve coordination. Research turned out in a supply chain with a singlesupplier and a single retailer, assuming supplier has the risk-neutral characteristic withand retailer has the risk-neutral or risk-averse characteristic, the wholesale price contractcan’t coordinate the supply chain. In the revenue sharing contract and repurchasecontracts, when the contract parameters satisfy certain conditions, the supply chaincomposed of risk-neutral supplier and retailer with risk appetite can achievecoordination. This paper also analyzes the retailer’s risk preference parameters on theperformance of the supply chain involved in the operation of enterprises and contractparameters.