Research On The Relationship Of Management Equity Incentive And Corporate Performance In Gem Listed Companies

With economic development and refinement of the social division of labor, companies’ owners delegate management rights to professional managers and retain residual claims.Namely ownership and management rights separate from each other. Operators act as owners to exercise daily management authority,who has the absolute advantage of information. As the interests of company owners often do not equate to the operators’, and there is incomplete contracts, the principal-agent problem appears. In order to solve this problem and converge the interests of shareholders and managers to improve corporate performance, equity incentive is applied to the company’s practice. Currently, the equity incentive in our country is given more and more attention. The problem related to the management of listed companies equity incentive is that corp orate management and academics in recent years focus es. Meanwhile, many GEM companies are also trying equity incentive system. The se companies hope to fully mobilize the enthusiasm and creativity of managers and make they work diligently and honestly to ensure the realization of the company’s development strategy and business objectives and to improve company performance by the incentive system. So, it relates to the issue of equity incentive and corporate performance. That is to say, whether equity incent ive system in GEM listed companies can improve corporate performance.This paper selects a sample of companies listed on GEM,and uses empirical analysis methods to research relationship of its implementation of equity incentive and corporate performance by means of SPSS19.0 software. First ly, this paper introduces the theory of equity incentive, which provides a theoretical basis for the empirical study below. Secondly, in view of the special nature of the GEM market, this paper details its features and sta tus, and analyzes the characteristics of its equity incentive. Finally, the empirical analysis section of this article is a important part. Combined with the specific circumstances of GEM listed company equity incentive, it analyzes management equity inc entive and corporate performance by descriptive statistics and regression analysis methods, and analyzes the problems and put forward corresponding measures. The results show that there is no correlation between management equity incentive and corporate performance in GEM companies. The main reasons are the low proportion of equity incentives and the lack of a sound governance structure and so on. Meanwhile this paper proposes corresponding countermeasures.