Design Of Suppliers Buyback Contract Based On Supply Chain Finance

The small and medium-sized enterprise has an enormous contribution to economic growth,but the financing problem has become an obstacle to SME development, because of the size,small and medium-sized enterprise face financing difficulties. With the development of the supply chain, supply chain finance become the effective approaches of solving the difficult financing of small and medium-sized enterprises, under the supply chain financial background,small and medium-sized enterprises with the supply chain in the core enterprise credit to banks for loans, in order to guarantee the normal operation of the supply chain, the core enterprise usually adopts buy back contract way to provide security to the small and medium-sized the enterprise, so that small and medium-sized enterprises can obtain loans. So thecore enterprise repurchase guarantee contract parameter design, determines whether it cansmoothly carry on financing and risk sharing effect.Aiming at the above problems, the parameters design of the supplier of this stood in the point of the supplier is discussed, assuming that the retailer already exists in the capital constraint,financial supply chain background, research on buy back contract suppliers to provide repo collateral contract with the previous different supply chain, supply chain under the background of financial repurchase guarantee contract with guarantee meaning, a guarantee of supply chain financing smoothly, on the other hand, ensure supply chain smoothly, sharing the retailer’s risk, so as to improve the overall supply chain profit of supply chain and the participating members of the income.This paper takes a consisting of a single supplier and retailers two echelon supply chain as the research object, assuming that the external market demand random and not affected by price, products for short life cycle products, market demand distribution function, productioncost and sales price are all system parameters. The presence of the Stackelberg gamebetween suppliers and retailers, as the leader of the Stackelberg game supplier, when retailers exist capital constraints, in which the supplier provides a repurchase guarantee to the bank for a loan. Parameter design of the supplier is responsible for the buy back contract,retailers to provide the buy back contract, determine its optimal in its own funds under different order decision. By constructing a mathematical model, with emphasis on the following three aspects:First, the retailer’s financing and ordering decision, to investigate the retailer with and withoutthe choice of financing repurchase guarantee contract and its own funds under the differentconditions, and the optimal order decision under different conditions.Second, the supplier retailer based on different order decision, to investigate the supplierprovide repo collateral contract conditions and parameter design problem when providebuyback contract.Third, to explore the interaction parameters between the effect of its own funds, research onretailers and repurchase guarantee contract order decision for retailers, as well as the influence of retailers’ private funds in the amount of repurchase guarantee contractformulation for suppliers.After the research, this paper found that in the absence of repurchase guarantee contractwhen the retailers choose financing, the order quantity decreases with increasing the amount of its own funds, and the supplier’s wholesale price is increasing. When the amount is greater than its own funds retailer’s choice of financing of the critical value, the order quantity and the supplier’s wholesale prices will increase, but the wholesale price will increase faster at the. In arepo collateral contract when the retailers choose financing, the order quantity will bedecreased with increasing amount of its own funds, but the supplier’s wholesale prices willdecline, supplier’s repurchase guarantee contract as a whole will have a decreasing trend.