The Research On The Three Party Collaboration Mode Of Financing Of The Supply Chain

With the environment of global competition paradigm shift, competition among enterprises have been transformed into a competition between the supply chain service system. In the context of the supply chain competition, how to enhance the financing capacity and financial product innovation of small and medium-sized enterprises(SME), so as to reduce its financing costs, has become an inevitable requirement of the supply chain and stable development. In this new financing model of supply chain finance, through effective integration of capital flow, information flow and logistics that belong to the core enterprise and SME in the supply chain and bank, effectively alleviate the financial pressure on SME, to increase the entire profit of the supply chain, reducing the bank’s credit risk. So that the three parties reached a win-win goal. The supply chain financing has been more and more attention and become the object of study of many scholars.We study a supply chain in which a retailer faces a classic newsvendor problem with a financial constraint on his capacity to order inventory. To sell more products, the manufacturer teams up with a bank to offer an interest-free loan program. We formulate the interaction between the retailer and the manufacturer as a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer has the dominant pricing power. Our results indicate that the loan program can significantly improve each party’s profit. The retailer becomes more aggressive in ordering when equilibrium order quantity is low but demand risk is high. We also investigate open account financing in which the manufacturer allows a partial and delayed payment, equivalent to a loan to the retailer. Compared with open account financing, bank financing improves the entire supply chain profit. This article is divided into five chapters. The first chapter explains the background and significance of the research, and the review of the relevant literature. The second chapter lists the theoretical basis of the research content. The third chapter proposes a model of supply chain financing, and made a comparison with the open account financing. In the fourth chapter analyzes the overall performance of the supply chain in the supply chain financing and tripartite coordinated supply chain contract. The last chapter is the conclusions of this study and suggestions.Numerical experiments demonstrate the supply chain performance under bank financing and indicate that demand volatility may actually improve contract efficiency. We propose two contract forms that coordinate the supply chain of these three parties. Finally, made several suggestions, such as to speed up and improve the service system of supply chain financing, the bank vigorously develop the supply chain financing business, the government should formulate relevant laws and regulations and actively guide the development of the supply chain financing.