Research On The Design And Selection Of Contract Mechanisms To Deal With Counterfeit Products In Supply Chain

Based on the current governance needs of the current situation of fraudulent counterfeit goods circulation in the supply chain at home and abroad,this thesis focuses on whether supply chain contracts as a non-punitive measure can provide the motivation for supply chain node enterprises to improve market health in terms of mechanism.This paper establishes a game model of the market mechanism compatible with contract incentives in the supply chain structure with counterfeit products,analyzes the game results between suppliers and retailers,and gives some economic explanations for the effectiveness of the contract mechanism against counterfeit products from a special perspective.This paper shows that a more complex contract such as a quantity discount contract will have an effect because of its richer parameter structure,which can form a certain constraint on the retailer’s counterfeiting behavior,and at the same time,compared with the wholesale price contract as the basic situation,it may also achieve the effect of profit not falling but rising,which is the benefit of complex contracts for both sides of the game.Through the establishment and analysis of the model,this thesis gives some positive results on the value of incentive(rather than punitive)measures to deal with counterfeits,which is rarely covered in previous literature,but this thesis does not advocate the use of incentives instead of punishment.At the end of this thesis,we mentions some extended discussions,shortcomings of this thesis,and possible future improvement directions.