Research On Opportunism Behaviors Of The Investors In The Ppp Project Operation Stage From The Contract And Regulatory Perspectives

The Chinese government is vigorously promoting the PPP mode to meet the requirements of the infrastructure construction. Project investors will take opportunistic behaviors to get self-interests because of the reasons including the different targets of government departments and private investors to participate in PPP projects and their information asymmetry in the whole life cycle of the PPP project, especially the duration longer operation stages. Opportunism behaviors of the project investors will damage the interests of government departments and the social public and affect the success of the PPP project. This paper studied opportunism behaviors of the investors in the PPP project operation stage from the contract and regulatory perspectives.Thesis analyzed the formation mechanism and manifestations of the investors’ opportunism behaviors in the PPP project operation stage. The principal-agent model when Private investors were opportunistic tendencies and were not opportunistic tendencies was constructed to analyze incentive mechanism of private investors in the PPP project operation stage based on the contractual relationship between government departments and private investors in PPP projects. The conclusion that private investors need to achieve higher project operation output to pay the same level of effort when they exist opportunistic tendencies and higher incentive intensity help reduce the opportunism behaviors of the private investors who have the opportunism tendency was founded. The Evolutionary Game Theory was used to analyze the policy choice of government and private investors’ opportunistic behaviors in the PPP project operation stage from the perspective of regulatory based on the regulatory functions of government administration. The result indicated that there was not a set of evolutionary stable strategy between the government and the private investors, but a cyclical behavioral pattern was appeared.The conclusion that the government’s administrative supervision can only reduce the opportunism behaviors of the investors and the fundamental way to eliminate private investors" opportunistic behaviors in the PPP project operation stage is the design contract improve the incentive intensity was founded. In this way, private investors can get higher rates of interest in PPP project operations. This article research was helpful to enrich the PPP mode theory research scope and to provide a reference for government departments of the PPP project governance.