The Effects Of Investors Protection From Information Disclosure Of Internal Control

With the publishing of 2008 Enterprise Internal Control Basic Norms, the requirements of internal control information disclosure of listed companies in C hina are much higher. Many listed companies disclose the ir internal control self assessment report and internal control audit report based on different motivations. Internal Control Guideline issued in 2010, marked the formal establishment of internal control standard system in China. Since then, the internal control information disclosure of listed companies in C hina formally opened the prelude of mandatory disclosure of internal control stage instead of the stage of voluntary disclosure.Internal control is implemented by the board of directors, management level and employees. It attempts to achieve enterprise management, financial reporting and compliance goals to pro vide reasonable assurance process. Problems such as what kind of economic consequences internal control information disclosure will produce, whether it can promote the improvement of internal control of listed companies, or whether it directly or indirectly protect the interests of investors cause the managers of the relevant parties such as investors and regulators attention. Foreign theoretical and empirical studies show that the improvement of internal control information disclosure can be achieved by reducing the informatio n asymmetry of managers and investors and the information asymmetry between the investors. It not only can reduce the agency cost and big shareholders capital take n up, but also can improve the quality of accounting information, reduce investors expect risk, and improve the liquidity of the stock to reduce the cost of equity capital.Based on the companies that have two phases of mandatory and voluntary internal control information disclosure as the research sample, this paper conducts empirical analysis of the relationship between internal control information disclosure, big shareholders capital take n up and equity capital cost. It provides new empirical evidence on the investor protection effects of the internal control disclosure of information study, which has important theoretical significance and practical significance.Based on the review of domestic and foreign related research literature and theory, this paper studies 2010-2013 Shanghai and Shenzhen main board listed companies’ internal control information disclosure to establish an index system of internal control information disclosure quality, and conduct in-depth analysis of the internal control information disclosure of listed companies on the role of investor protection. Results show that mandatory disclosure of internal control information disclosure has made some progress compared with voluntary disclosure stage, and the quality of internal control information disclosure is significantly increased; The higher the quality of internal control information disclosure of enterprise agency cost, the less big shareholder capital take n up, the lower the cost of equity capital. It is also found that internal control information disclosure investor protection effect is stronger in the stage of mandatory disclosure.Finally, based on the above findings, this paper puts forward several policy suggestions: perfect the relevant market laws and regulations, take more compulsory measures; The listed company should improve the recognition of the importance of internal control information disclosure; Establish internal control evaluation standards and auditing standards.