Research On The Influencing Factors Of Large Shareholders’ Occupation Of Funds

The separation of property right and management right is a notable feature of modern enterprise. Under the premise of equity decentralization, agency problem between owners and managers is the main problem of corporate governance research. However, in most emerging markets, ownership characteristics of listed companies are highly concentrated. Although highly concentrated equity has moderate effect between the owner and the manager to some extent, it can cause asymmetry of control and information between large shareholders and minority shareholders. Due to the imperfect external legal protection mechanisms, lager shareholders may occupy the funds of their listed companies by transferring assets and profits for their own profits, resulting in the infringement on the interests of minority shareholders. Based on this, the principal-agent problem between large shareholders and minority shareholders has gradually become the focus of research. In China, the"only one big share" is the company’s significant feature, and the external market needs improvement, it is necessary to reform the relevant laws and regulations and judicial protection is not perfect, protection of investors, especially small investors still flawed, so compared to the British and American countries, the degree of lager shareholders’occupation of funds is high in China. Therefore, to study the influencing factors of lager shareholders’occupation of funds and form the restricting mechanism have particular importance.This article mainly use the method of the combination of theoretical and empirical analysis, first analyze the influencing factors of occupation of listed companies’funds in theory, including ownership structure, board characteristics, the quality of external audit and product market competition, and then select 1086 samples of 2010-2012 china’s listed companies to do the empirical testing, the main conclusions are:first, the improvement of ownership concentration will increase the degree of occupation of funds, the existence of the second to the tenth largest shareholders will inhibit it, and compared with state-controlled listed companies, the degree of occupation of funds of non-state-controlled listed companies is more serious; Second, the existence of independent director and the separation of the board of directors and general manager have inhibitory effect on the degree of occupation of funds; Third, the improvement of external audit quality will effectively restrict the degree of occupation of funds; Fourth, as a result of government protection, the less competitive the industry of listed companies, the greater the degree of large shareholders’occupation of funds. In the end, the article put forward relevant recommendations based on the conclusions.