Property Nature, Executive Pay Gap And Perk Consumption

Financial tsunami that was induced by Subprime Crisis, caused discussion on the "middle-income and high-income trap black hole", a fair distribution of income has become an important issue in the 21st century. Placed in front of the world economy is no longer how to expand the production capacity of the community, but how fair distribution of the wealth, increase well-being of the whole society. Our long-term Gini coefficient over the warning level of 0.4, the income distribution reform is urgently needed, the relevant government departments have issued a series of policies. However, frequent incidents of astronomical salaries, executive pay raises for the warm attention. Under the salary information disclosure and widening income gap circumstances, many researchers pay more attention to the influence which external salary comparison has on agent behaviors. In many proxy behavior, managerial perk consumption attracts more concern. Excessive consumption has produced some new agent problems.Based on this background, the paper selected non-financial listed companies as samples in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share board from 2007 to 2013, with the ratio of executive pay and the same property with the nature of the industry average in the same year as the pay gap, and researched the effect which pay gap had on managerial perk consumption with thinking about property nature. Firstly, the paper drew on the principal-agent theory, asymmetric information theory and psychological contract theory and combined with domestic and international literature review of relevant studies to determine the perspective of the study. Then, based on the definition of relevant concepts, the paper uses principal-agent theory, asymmetric information theory and psychological contract theory as the theoretical analysis tool to clarify the mechanism that property rights and executive pay gap have impact on perk consumption. Property under different institutional arrangements, information asymmetry and agency conflicts between non-state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises show great differences, resulting in very different economic consequences. Information asymmetry in state-owned enterprises is higher than the non-state-owned enterprises enterprises, coupled with efforts to blur its managers and corporate performance relationship degree, making executive compensation contract transaction cost is much higher than the non-state-owned enterprises SOEs. Under the cost-effective, state-owned enterprise managers are faced a more consistent salary management system, and its high political cost leads to more administrative intervention, resulting in a gap between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned executive pay executives significant differences in the pay gap. On the principal-agent problem with consumer-related job, the state-owned enterprises have mainly a conflict between management and shareholders, rather than state-owned enterprises mainly between large shareholders and minority shareholders of the conflict. In the non-state-owned listed companies, large shareholders are often part-time management, both to control the identity management easier by virtue of its absolute superiority about voting decision-job consumption, to achieve the interests of occupation. Compared with the state-owned enterprises, the extent of non-state enterprises serving the consumer’s performance is more serious. Based on the economic interests of executives and fairness preference, the paper broadens the traditional principal-agent analysis framework by introducing the psychological contract theory. Although the content of the psychological contract do not specify, and cannot be enforced by a third party, but it is powerful determinants about the attitude and behavior of employees. Executives of the psychological contract obligations framed the principal motivation. On the basis of pay for social comparison, executives adjust their agent behavior through perceived breach of psychological contract fulfillment. When comparing the pay gap after a downward departure time, the pay gap will lead to a negative perception of the psychological contract violation executives, or being exploited to produce feelings of injustice, to stimulate the use of hidden means to make up their own service consumption motivation utility, so the extent of job consumption increases. When comparing the pay gap after a up departure time, it will lead to a positive perception of the psychological contract fulfillment executives, and executives show some psychological guilt, thereby stimulating its active agent behavior, reduce the motivation to enhance their use of self-service consumer utility. In addition, based on the clear impact of the mechanism we propose research hypothesis. Finally, we design study, identify study variables and are going on regression analysis.The results show that in the case of the same nature with the property industry average in the same year as a reference, there is a significant difference in the gap between SOEs and non-SOEs executive pay-gap. Higher than the industry average in the group, state-owned enterprises executive pay gap compared with non-state-owned enterprises are small. Below the industry average in the group, state-owned enterprises executive pay gap is bigger than the non-state-owned enterprises. The degree of state-owned enterprises and service consumption is significantly lower than the non-state-owned enterprises. The managers not only pay attention to the pursuit of absolute executive pay, more concerned about the relative pay. Pay gap based on external comparisons significantly affects the degree of job consumption, negative correlation between the two, the pay gap changes consumer behavior executives job choices through influencing executives perceived psychological contract fulfillment. Relative to non-state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises executive pay gap has little effect on job consumption. In addition, due to differences in state-owned enterprises control level, the local state-owned enterprises and the central enterprises also shows some differences. Higher than the industry average of state-owned enterprises, executive pay gap has no significant difference between the central enterprises and local state-owned enterprises; in below the industry average of state-owned enterprises, and the ratio of local state-owned high executive pay is significantly lower than the industry average compared to the central business executives, showing a smaller pay gap. The extent of local state-owned perk consumption is significantly lower than the degree of central enterprises serving the consumer, and the pay gap of the local state-owned enterprises has lower impact on the perk consumption level. Finally, we make some suggestion on the disclosure of perk consumption information, salary system design, deepen reform of the income distribution and so on.