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Do Directors Appointed By Non-state Shareholders Inhibit Excess Perk Consumption Of Executives?

Posted on:2021-04-22Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:W Z ZouFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330647460406Subject:Business management
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In recent years,with the deepening of the mixed ownership reform in China,some state-owned enterprises have the phenomenon that non-state shareholders appoint representatives to participate in corporate governance.In the practice of corporate governance reform of state-owned enterprises,the agency problem between shareholders and managers is more prominent than that of non-state-owned enterprises.At present,the absolute amount of excess perk consumption in many state-owned enterprises far exceeds that of executive compensation,and has an increasing proportion in total assets.This paper studies the influence of directors appointed by non-state shareholders on excess perk consumptions of executives,and the changes of the relationship between directors appointed by non-state shareholders and excess perk consumptions of executives under the influence of different conditions.Based on the data of listed companies with mixed ownership in China,this paper analyzes the relationship between directors appointed by non-state shareholders and excess perk consumptions of executives under different internal and external conditions.Research results show that directors appointed by non-state shareholders is conducive to inhibit excess perk consumptions;and in the mixed enterprises with higher ownership concentration,lower management power,higher industry competition or at the local administrative hierarchy,directors appointed by non-state shareholders have a more significant inhibitory effect on excess perk consumptions;further research finds that directors appointed by non-state shareholders have a significant positive effect on corporate performance,and excess perk consumptions have a negative effect on corporate performance,excess perk consumptions play a part mediating role in the influence of directors appointed by non-state shareholders on corporate performance.This paper also provides some suggestions for improving corporate supervision and governance mechanisms,for solving the problem of excess perk consumption,and for promoting the reform of mixed ownership enterprises by classification.
Keywords/Search Tags:Mixed Ownership, Non-state Shareholders, Appointed Director, Enterprise Governance, Excess Perk Consumption
PDF Full Text Request
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