Research On The Impact Of Power Of Listed Company’s Management On The Earnings Management

As our country’s enterprise reform process of delegating power to deepen, the power of listed company management is getting more expand. To some extent, this can arouse the enthusiasm of executives and motivation, but in the process of accumulation for power will inevitably produce "insider control" problem, which affects the enterprise long-term stable development. Management of the abuse of earnings management behavior will cause the distortion of accounting information disclosure; mislead stakeholders judgment and decision, which leads to the capital market allocation inefficiency. The system background of listed companies in China and the market environment, based on the perspective of internal governance mechanism, this dissertation uses theoretical and empirical analysis methods to investigate the listed company management power on earnings management. By comparing the impact of two part-time of chairman and general manager, the board scale, equity dispersion as well as the property rights, the dissertation aims to obtain some theoretical conclusions and practical values, and put forward the relevant policy suggestions.This dissertation contains five parts. The first part is introduction, mainly introduces the research background and significance, literature reviewed and innovation and features. The second part is relevant concept definition and theoretical basis, mainly defines the management power, accrued earnings management, real earnings management and other related concepts, and the principal-agent theory, theory of management power and surplus management theory. The third part is the theoretical analysis and the research hypothesis. This part describes the present situation of the management power concentrated in the listed companies in China, and analyzes the impact on the earnings management from management power mechanism and the research hypothesis. The fourth part is the empirical research part. This article selects 2006-2013 in both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange of the A-share listed companies as research samples, using the modified Jones model and Roychowdhury measuring method inspection management power to influence the degree of earnings management. The fifth part is the research conclusions and policy recommendations. The study concludes:(1) the management’s power of the structure has a significant positive influence on earnings management behavior; (2) the bigger the power of the board scale, the higher the degree of earnings management; (3) equity dispersion has no obvious positive correlation with earnings management; (4) the greater the comprehensive index of management power, the higher the degree of earnings management; (5) compared with the state-owned enterprises, the non-state-owned enterprises management of power are more significant positive correlation with earnings management. Finally, this article embarks from the company internal and external governance mechanism proposed to the management of listed companies earnings management behavior of policy recommendations.