Institutional Investors, Ceo Turnover And Enterprise Value

In contemporary company system enterprises, executives as decision makers and the executor of the strategic, play a decisive role. CEO of listed companies replaces frequently, which have big influence on the enterprise value. Executive changes directly affect the effect of corporate governance, it is particularly urgent for enterprises to establish a scientific and reasonable employment mechanism. Corporate governance mechanism is the key factors of enterprise value, the scientific hiring managers is the basis of forming scientific governance structure, by tying the employment of company executives and enterprise value, scientific and reasonable contract mechanism can restricts the senior managers’inaction to a great extent. In recent years, institutional investors are developing rapidly. Renowned scholars at home and abroad research and analysis the corporate governance effect of institutional investors carefully, conclusions showed that institutional shareholders as external independent shareholders could supervise the behavior of the executives, realized corporate governance to a certain extent. Institutional investors as external shareholder of listed companies, has the talent, technology and capital advantages, while how to affect the behavior of the executive, how to play to give play to the role of corporate governance and improve enterprise value?This article is divided into six chapters:the first chapter is introduction, according to the relevant background, puts forward the problem to study in the paper, this section includes research significance, main content and method of research, etc. The second part is literature review, which mainly reviews study of institutional investors, executives change and enterprise value relations at home and abroad, providing reference for empirical research next. The third chapter is background, according to the theory of principal-agent and the theoretical basis of shareholder activism, from current situation and legal basis of institutional investors and executive turnover, we make a concrete analysis of Institutional investors and executives change on the influence the enterprise value, lying a theoretical foundation for the empirical study. The fourth chapter and the fifth chapter is mainly empirical research based on data from 2007-2012 samples, including empirical research of the relation about institutional investors and executives change, empirical research of the relation about the change of the executive and on enterprise value. The sixth chapter is the conclusion and policy suggestions, providing some guidelines for optimizing the corporate governance in our country and developing scientific employment mechanism.According to the above research, this paper concludes that institutional investors holding are positively related to executive changes, but not significant; The higher the institutional investor shareholding, the more likely the executive is changing for low business performance, institutional investors holding promotes the change of the executive and the sensitivity of the company’s performance. At the same time, compared with without executive ownership, the higher the institutional investors holding, the smaller the possibility of executive change; Aimed at the economic consequences of a change, research results shows that: Executive changes can enhance corporate value, and have certain continuity, executives change at the following year raises significantly greater than the change in those days. Combined with the research conclusion of the article, strengthening the corporate governance structure, establishing and improving the employment mechanism is imminent. We can complete the securities market, develop institutional investors vigorously, improve the corporate governance structure, and improve enterprise value under the balance of the external environment.