Institutional Investors, Property And Executive Pay-Performance Sensitivity

Since the separation of ownership, the modern enterprise has designed a series of incentives try to match the control and ownership, one of the most typical mechanism is to allow authorities to have some residual claims, resulting in the development of the design of remuneration management mechanism.After decades of development and growth, the institutional investors gain more power to participate in the management of listed companies. Compared with individual investors, institutional investors have a strong information-gathering capabilities and expertise to better play the role of principal. However, institutional investors are likely to suffer the constraints of state-owned property. So, it is full of important significance to consider the effect of state-owned property.The thesis is divided into six parts and the steps are as follows:Part Ⅰ describes the background and significance, as well as innovation of this study, the content and the method described in the paper, and finally provides research and innovation.Part Ⅱ reviews the extent of the literature in and overseas. Part Ⅲ is theoretical analysis. By analyzing the basic theory and the theory of the phenomenon find a meeting point between the hypotheses proposed for the text of the offer ideas. Part IV is research design. Through detailed analysis of the phenomena and theory to select study sample, and then propose hypotheses and define sample data variables.Part V is the results of empirical analysis. Firstly, selecting the samples to analyze the relations between institutional investors and executive pay-performance sensitivity. Secondly, verifying the effect of state-owned property.Part Ⅵ is the conclusions and recommendations. And propose appropriate policy conclusions and recommendations, and put forward the limitations and research prospects of this article in the last.Innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in the following two points:First, the research perspective is novel. This is little research on the relationships of institutional investors, and this paper enriches the research. Second, based on our specific research background. Research on the governance role of institutional investors are more abundant aboard, many domestic scholars mostly counterfeit foreign research ideas to emphasis on the heterogeneity of institutional investors, and then analysis the effect of different institutional investors. However, China’s stock market is rather special, in which state-owned property plays a major role; this paper studied the effects of state-owned property with heavy ink.