Integration Of Agriculture And Gaming Of National Interests In The European Union

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU) has been a cornerstone in the process of European integration, and a symbol of the joint effort to construct a more unified Europe. CAP is the only policy domain that is both mandatory and fully funded by the EU budget, of which it occupies the biggest portion since its inception and till present. The heavy subsidy makes sense in the initial years of CAP as it caters to the joint needs under the context of a depressed agricultural industry and insufficient provisions. Nevertheless, problems such as severe overproduction, EU budgetary burden, protectionist condemns in external trade, etc. have emerged and necessitate CAP to conduct a radical reform.However, given the diversity of national characteristics and the discrepancy in welfare brought by CAP, member states hold contradictory opinions vis-a-vis the current system. Though the competence of CAP is conferred to the union, the institutional setting and the community decision-making procedure offer plenty of space of maneuvering. A systematic examination reveals the institutional flaws in EU: once the change on CAP imperils the core interest of certain member states, they can find their way through EU institutions to interfere. In practice, the internal reforms are still constrained to the transformation of the pattern of funding rather than to curtail the volume or to restructure to co-financing. The post-2013 reform shows a sliding-back to agricultural protectionism and more discretion conferred to member states. Meanwhile, external trade negotiation in agriculture is stuck in a WTO deadlock.The analysis deduces a conclusion as such:departing from national interests, member states would interfere into the decision-making in EU through institutional flaws in case of a heterogeneity of interests. As core members diverge vis-a-vis CAP reform, radical change to the status quo, though desirable, can be hardly actualized. The conclusion can be generalized as:the nominal supranational pattern of EU still allows for intergovernmental bargain through institutional flaws. Once a need to change hinders the core interest of certain powerful member state(s), the reform of the union tends be sluggish.