The Study On The Uncooperative Relation Between The Professional Manager And The Owner In The Family-controlled Firms

As the development of modern enterprise system,the family firms begin to cooperate with the professional managers by employing them. However, the existence of different objectives between them leads non-cooperative behavior appear,showing an uncooperative relationship between shareholders and managers. The types of uncooperative relationship includes “Agent non-cooperation” and “Deprived non-cooperation”.The agent non-cooperation is caused by the agency problem owing to the shareholders’ interests hurt by the managers.The deprived non-cooperation is caused by the deprivation problem owing to the managers’ interests deprived by the shareholders.The deprived non-cooperation is embodied in the vacancy of professional managers’ managerial power,closing the human capital and the resignation.It may seriously affect the governance structure and the healthy growth of family firms.The thesis selects 465 sample family firms listed in the middle-small board or GEM from 2010 to 2013 as the research foundation,and makes an empirical analysis on the influence to uncooperative relationship between professional manager and the firm owner by the enterprise internal deprivation. The research selects the owner’s authority, the owner’s personal ability,the family internal control and the development of the firm itself as explaining variables,and selects a series index such as the professional managers’ managerial power,human capital and the resignation to reflect degree of the uncooperative relationship. By means of the factor analysis, it can obtain a comprehensive index as the explained variable which can measure the uncooperative relationship. Finally,this research uses the correlation and regression analysis to verify the hypothesis and draws some conclusions following : The degree of the non-cooperation is positively correlated with the owner’ s personal authority, personal ability and the family internal control, but the degree of the non-cooperation is negatively correlated with the firm’s border.There is no a significant correlation among the non-cooperation,the owner’s age and the firm’s listed year. This thesis argues that recognizing clearly the performance and harm caused by the non-cooperation is conducive to the stably long-term development of family firms.At last,some advice about standardizing the family firm’s behavior and improving the governance structure is put forward.