Research On The Controlling Shareholders’ Tunneling Of Manufacturing-listed Companies In Our Country

In the listed companies of our country, the manufacturing-listed companies occupyan important position. Their development is very important to the overall economy.However, the tunneling of controlling shareholders in manufacturing-listed companiesnot only has negative effect on the development of the companies, but the developmentof the whole industry, even our country. However, among our listed companies, thereis a general case，“due to dominance”.Especially the case is popular in themanufacturing-listed companies. Researching on manufacturing tunneling oflisted-companies in our country, to find out the influence factor, which has an importantguiding significance in improving the medium and small investors’ interests protectionmechanism. In the same time, it is advantageous to make the corresponding decisions toachieve better production for the manufacturing-listed company internal managers, tomaximize the value of the company goal, and serve better for the shareholders.Furthermore， the research promotes the development of manufacturing industry in ourcountry.Theoretically,the research enriches listed company’s agency theory anddevelops related theoretical research.Firstly，the paper gives a instruction about the research of Chinese and foreignscholars in detail, and summarizes the research achievements of controllingshareholders’ tunneling. Secondly, the paper summarizes controlling shareholders’tunneling behaviors theory, and detailed analyzes tunneling behavioral forms andinfluence, which lay a foundation to further research on tunneling behaviors inmanufacturing-listed companies. Thirdly,this paper analyzes the influence factors witha combination of theory with practice,and proposes the corresponding assumptions.Fourthly, the paper uses Shanghai and Shenzhen manufacturing-listed company’s data tomake statistical descriptions and regression analysis, trying to find out the relatedfactors.Finally, according to the empirical analysis conclusion,it puts forward thecorresponding measures.The main conclusion of this paper are as follows: the case ‘due to dominance’increases tunneling behavior; the number of independent directors and the tunneling isinverse; the effect of controller properties of large shareholders is not significantlyrelated to the tunneling; two posts have a certain influence to the tunneling ofcontrolling shareholders in manufacturing-listed companies;supervisory board haven’t played their supervision power; external audit is in the opposite direction to thetunneling of major shareholders in manufacturing-listed companies.In this paper, the main innovation are as follows. Firstly, innovation on data. Thepaper uses the recent five years’ data, to reflect the situation of manufacturing-listedcompanies. Secondly, innovation on the empirical process. When making assumptions,it summaries the research results of former researchers and the related theoreticalanalysis, combines with the actual situation of the listed companies to introduce theinternal governance factors and external audit factors into the model comprehensively.Thirdly, suggestions on innovation. According to the former conclusion, the paper putsforward corresponding countermeasures in two aspects of internal governance structureand external environment.Further more，the paper puts forward suggestions according tothe actual situation of our manufacturing-listed companies.