Design, Modeling And Simulation Of An Incentive Contract For The Electricity Market Considering Risk-aversion

An incentive electricity bidding contract considering risk aversion is presented in this dissertation, aiming at designing an incentive contract with which the electricity price soaring could be suppressed. A series of studies on the role and impact of the incentive electricity bidding contract on the electricity market are analyzed and discussed in this dissertation, and are given as follows:A multi-agent simulation framework of the electricity market is built to simulate functions of each member in the electricity market and competitive interactions among ISO and generating companies. The multi-agent framework also provides a simulation platform for the following test on the impacts of the incentive bidding contract.Further, a series of discrete scenes are applied to describe all possible scenarios, and a bad-scenario set is defined as a combination of bad scenarios in which electricity price soars. An incentive electricity bidding contract considering risk aversion is designed by integrating of bad scenario set and idea of mechanism design, with the aid of the incentive contract. A balance factor is introduced to coordinate the balance between the optimal expected average price and anti-risk robustness. Moreover, a one-leader-multiple-followers Stackelberg-game based bi-level programming model is built to study the ISO’s incentive contract’s effects and generating companies’ response strategies, and a weight factor is applied for the realization of twofold objectives: relieving price soaring and minimizing electricity purchasing cost Numerical examples are given to illustrate the effectiveness of the incentive contract.Lastly, considering the individual rational evolution of the ISO Agent and generator Agents,a Q-learning reinforce algorithm is introduced to simulate the learning behaviors of the ISO Agent and generator Agents. Comparisons of three cases are given to analyze the validity of the incentive contract in the long run: case without incentive contract or Q-learning, case with incentive contract but no Q-learning, and case with incentive contract and Q-learning, and the comparisons verify that the incentive contract could lessen the electricity price mutation in thelong run.