| In the practice of investment management,the improvement and development of leadership is no longer something that can be solved by the unilateral elements of the leader.Instead,it is necessary to accurately understand the role and role of followers,so as to promote the relationship between leaders and followers under the constraint of followership development of.Now,whether in academia or the industry,people's understanding of the important role of followers in the organization and the ability of followers to the development of the organization has made a big leap.At present,domestic and foreign researchers have interpreted the follow-up force from their respective research perspectives,and a rigorous and systematic research theoretical system has not yet been formed.Especially in the context of Chinese organizations,what kind of structure does the follow-up structure model show? What are the external or internal factors that will affect the strength of follow-up in the rapidly changing environment for investment companies? How these factors affect the relationship between leaders and followers,how this relationship can be quantified as much as possible;how the follower 's investment decisions affect the leader 's decisions,and the specific improvement path of followership What.For these issues,domestic and foreign scholars have only made some preliminary discussions,and have not carried out in-depth research in combination with specific national conditions and actual conditions of enterprises.The article uses empirical and theoretical modeling methods to reveal the essential connotation and structural model of the relationship between leaders and followers under the constraint of follower power,and explore the main influencing factors of the relationship between leaders and followers under the constraint of follower power.Starting from the perspective of followers,based on the follower's initiative and creativity in flexibly responding to competitive changes,in-depth study of the connotation and structural model,influencing factors and theoretical models of followership,and the interactive relationship between followership and leadership dynamics The reaction force largely surpassed the interpretation of follow-up force from the perspective of unidirectional speculation by researchers at home and abroad,with a view to more accurately and objectively revealing the connotation and structural model of follow-up force in the context of investment.The study reached some important conclusions:(1)From the perspective of quantitative research,the article analyzes the issue of information dissemination in the integration of followership and leadership.The article proposes a model of a leader and multiple followers.The leader must decide whether to voluntarily disclose important business operation information,and the follower wants to maximize the personal return.The follower's effectiveness,the leader's personal popularity and The personal investment cost of a leader is a key factor in determining a leader's decision.(2)The article analyzes the decentralized and centralized decision-making of leaders and followers.Centralized decision-making can increase the total revenue of leaders and followers,and the investment scale of centralized decision-making is larger than that of decentralized decision-making.The study found that new allocation mechanisms need to be developed to induce leaders to choose the optimal investment scale for centralized decision-making.An effective revenue sharing mechanism is a key part of ensuring the stability of the leader and follower alliance.The revenue sharing mechanism refers to the followers giving the established funds to the leader at a lower investment price.After the leader meets the investment needs,the leader follows The leader shares the leader's income with the leader,while sharing the leader's investment loss.(3)The article analyzes the interest coordination mechanism and benefit distribution mechanism of leaders and followers,and studies the decentralized and centralized decision-making of leaders and followers under Stackelberg.The decision is made by the leader first,and the follower is based on the leader's choice.decision making.Similarly,centralized decision-making can increase the total return of leaders,and the investment scale of centralized decision-making is larger than that of decentralized decision-making.(4)By introducing trust,based on the consideration of information disclosure and investment prices,the investment team composed of "one leader-multiple followers" is used as the research object to model the expected returns of members,and game theory is adopted.And mechanism design methods to obtain the optimal decision-making mix of leaders and followers.The study found that when the initial information disclosure volume of the product and the decision model of the leader and follower are different,the degree of trust affects the optimal investment amount differently;the degree of trust affects the amount of information disclosure,the benefit of the leader and follower,and the coordination mechanism Similarly,the impact on the optimal investment price is opposite;increasing trust can reduce the amount of information disclosure for leaders;increasing trust can reduce the amount of information disclosure under centralized decision-making,and only in the case of decentralized decision-making when the trust is greater than a certain threshold Reduce the amount of information disclosed by leaders.(5)Based on the consideration of green technology,the article builds a green technology model of investment cooperation consisting of leaders and followers.The article analyzes the game model under full cooperation,total non-cooperation,and green technology cost allocation.The results show that: the green technology cost allocation coefficient affects the level of green technology in the three games;the benefits under the completely non-cooperative cooperation and cost allocation model are affected by green Impact of technology cost allocation coefficient;investment coordination cannot be achieved under total non-cooperation and green technology cost allocation decisions;the market price in the green technology cost allocation model was optimized by Nash negotiations and games to achieve the optimal overall investment and parity between the two parties.Recto optimal.In the end,the article finds the specific improvement path of the relationship between the leader and the follower under the constraint of follower power,and does some basic research for building the relationship between the leader and the follower under the constraint of follower power.This article may lead to the following innovations:(1)A structural equation model reflecting the leader-follower relationship was developed.Based on structural equation modeling and other methods,the article is to interpret the key factors that influence the leader-follower relationship and the complex relationships between these factors.Under the prerequisite of information disclosure,the key factors in formation and benefit sharing,including price mechanism,decision-making status,trust,and advanced technology,are important aspects that influence the leader-follower relationship and will ultimately affect followership;under the prerequisite of job effectiveness,the key factors in formation and information disclosure,expected benefits of followers,leader effectiveness,leader personal visibility,leader personal investment cost,are important aspects that affect the relationship between leaders and followers,which will eventually be reflected by benefit sharing;under the premise of information disclosure,the key factors that form with investment price,investment demand,leader's ability,leader's return,follower's investment cost,amount of information disclosure,follower's return,are important aspects that affect the relationship between leaders and followers,which will also eventually be reflected by benefit sharing.(2)An evolutionary model of the dynamic development of the leader-follower relationship is built.The article investigates the benefit and distribution relationship between leaders and followers in different situations through key factors such as information disclosure,price mechanism,decision-making position,trust model,and green technology.The article can be obtained through information disclosure research:leader's effectiveness,leader's personal popularity and leader's personal investment cost are the key factors that determine leader's decision;through price mechanism research,it is found that a new allocation mechanism needs to be developed to induce leaders to choose the optimal investment size for centralized decision making,and an effective benefit sharing mechanism is a key part related to leaders and followers to maintain the stability of their alliance.part;based on the decision position model,it is found that centralized decision can increase the total return and the investment size of centralized decision is larger than the investment size of decentralized decision;by introducing trust degree,its effect on the amount of information disclosure,leader-follower return and coordination mechanism is the same,and the opposite effect on the optimal investment price,increasing trust degree can induce the leader to disclose less information and increasing trust degree can reduce the centralized decision,and under the decentralized decision model,the leader's disclosure can be reduced only when the trust degree is greater than a certain threshold;under the green technology constraint,the benefits under the fully uncooperative model and the cost-sharing model are affected by the green technology cost-sharing coefficient,and the coordination of investment cannot be achieved under the fully uncooperative and green technology cost-sharing decisions.(3)An optimal investment decision model for leaders and followers under different scenarios is constructed.The article analyzes the dynamic decision-making process of leaders and followers based on theoretical models such as structural equation approach,game and mechanism design approach,price mechanism design,decision position analysis,trust degree design and green technology application.Based on the structural equation approach,based on the research results and its own modeling attempts,it can be found that earnings sharing has the premise of mediating variables between information disclosure and investment price,so there exists the hypothesis of a mediating relationship between the importance of earnings sharing factors on information disclosure and the importance of investment price,which eventually forms the investment theory that information disclosure will be transmitted and influence followers ultimately through the mechanism of earnings sharing Based on the game and mechanism design approach,we analyze that from the perspective of information disclosure,leaders must decide whether to voluntarily disclose important information about corporate operations and that followers want to maximize their personal returns to determine the price of investment;from the perspective of price mechanism,we study the need to develop an allocation mechanism to induce leaders to choose the optimal size of investment for centralized decision making,and an effective price mechanism that is ensure the stability of leader-follower coalition;from the perspective of decision position,study the investment price formation mechanism based on Stackelberg game,analyze the decentralized and centralized decision making of leaders and followers under Stackelberg,and the degree of impact of centralized decision making on increasing total return;from the perspective of trust,analyze the amount of initial information disclosure of the product and the leader-follower decision making pattern not From the perspective of green technology,based on the consideration of information disclosure and investment price,the study takes the "one leader-multiple followers" investment team as the object.From a green technology perspective,based on information disclosure and investment price considerations,the study uses an investment team composed of "one leader-multiple followers" to model the expected returns of the members and obtain the optimal combination of leader and follower decisions. |
PDF Full Text Request