Channel Selection In Multi-channel Supply Chain Based On Free Riding

The multiple-channel which is composed of online channel and retail channel is extensively adopted by manufacturers and retailers due to the prosperity of electrical commerce. When customers obtain services from retailer and place their business with another channel, the free riding problem occurs. Free riding behavior profoundly affects the pricing strategy and channel selection of supply chain members. In this context, the dissertation discusses the decision of manufacturers and retailers based on free riding behavior of retailer service. The main content of this dissertation is as follows:First, consider consumers’ preference and free riding behavior, the dissertation analyzes the manufacturers and retailers optimal pricing strategy of decentralized decision by Stackelberg dynamic game under traditional retail channel, manufacturer dual-channel, retailer dual-channel and double dual-channels. Meanwhile, discusses how free riding influences price and profit by example stimulation; then studies the price and profit under the circumstances of manufacturer first establishes online channel and retailer first establishes online channel from the perspectives of the both supply chain members; furthermore, analyzes the channel selection of decentralized decision and how the selection influences another member of the supply chain.Secondly, the dissertation compares the above four supply chain models’ price and profit of centralized decision with those of decentralized decision. On this basis, improves the model with transfer payment contract, and calculates the price and profit in this condition. Then discusses how free riding behavior impacts coordinate pricing, fixed transfer payment and profit, hence, optimized channel selection of each supply chain member is obtained.Finally, based on the evolutionary game theory, considers manufacturer and retailer as bounded rationality participant, establishes replicator dynamics equation of different strategies after replacing game group with game individual and traditional game with game party strategy type, then analyzes replication dynamic relationship of two game parties proportion and supply chain model evolution results under different circumstances, thus the equilibrium structure of supply chain system is obtained. How free riding and channel preference of decentralized decision affect channel selection is also discusses by example stimulation.The results imply that free riding and channel preference have different influence on manufacturer and retailer’s strategy evolution path, while supply chain system evolves into building online channel. In consideration of transfer payment contract, channel selection is affected by free riding behavior and fixed transfer payment, thus manufacturer indirectly interfere retailer’s channel selection strategy via formulating transfer payment contract.