Research On The Sharing Mechanism Of Fresh Agricultural Products Under The Fresh-keeping Efforts

Fresh agricultural product is perishable product,has obvious seasonal and regional,demands high freshness-keeping in the process of picking,transportation and sales.And fresh effort directly affect the freshness and then affect the market demand.This paper studies a two-stage fresh agricultural product supply chain consisting of single supplier and retailer.Three game models were established where market demand is uncertain and related to the freshness-keeping effort:cooperative game model,Stackelberg game model led by supplier,Stackelberg game model led by retailers.First of all,the Stackelberg game model led by supplier is developed to study the coordination mechanism of this supply chain with symmetric freshness-keeping effort information,this paper studies the optimal of the freshness-keeping effort level,wholesale price,retail price and the profit of both sides of Supply chain.Furthermore,aiming to the Stackelberg game model,it proves that the traditional revenue-sharing contract cannot realize coordination of the supply chain,and it establishes a coordination mechanism with effort cost sharing.The research shows that when the proportion of revenue-sharing and cost sharing meets certain conditions,the supply chain can achieve coordination and allot the whole expected profit between supplier and retailer arbitrarily.At last,through the numerical simulation results,it shows the impact of revenue sharing coefficient on the level of freshness-keeping effort,wholesale price,supplier and retailer profits.Secondly,the fresh agricultural products retailer dominated supply chain was taken as the research object,this paper analyzes the optimal of the freshness-keeping effort level,wholesale price,market retail price and the profits of both sides in this case,then analyzes the effects of three decision sequences on the supplier,the retailer and the supply chain.Furthermore,aiming to the Stackelberg game model led by retailer,it proves that revenue-sharing + effort cost sharing can realize coordination of the supply chain.The research shows that when the proportion of revenue-sharing and cost sharing meets certain conditions,the supply chain can achieve coordination and allot the whole expected profit between supplier and retailer arbitrarily.Finally,the influence of the revenue sharing coefficient on the level of freshness preservation,the wholesale price,the profit of the supplier and the retailer is discussed by numerical analysis.Finally,to solve the information asymmetry of the level of the freshness-keeping effort the fresh agricultural products supply chain between enterprises this paper respectively analyses the impact of supplier concealing behavior and concealing actions on supply chain performance both when the supplier and the retailer was in a leadership position.When the supplier is in a leading position,Concealing the information on the level of freshness-keeping effort can reduce the profit and the performance of the supply chain.In this case,the supplier would not conceal the level of preservation efforts;When the retailer is in a position of leadership,the retailer's decision making authority allows the supplier to publish information on the level of freshness-keeping efforts,if supplier hides the information on the level of preservation efforts,supplier will get lower profits,in this case,the supplier will not conceal the level of freshness-keeping efforts.Furthermore,the paper puts forward the "revenue sharing contract +cost sharing contract" in these two cases.The research shows that the supplier's hiding information behavior does not affect the optimal wholesale price and retail price,but it will reduce the level of preservation efforts,the profits of suppliers and retailers,and damage the overall profit of the supply chain.The revenue sharing and cost sharing contract can ensure the information sharing of the fresh effort level and realize the coordination of supply chain.