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Coordination Of Fresh Products Supply Chain With Freshness?keeping Effort

Posted on:2020-03-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X J ZhouFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330596495650Subject:Logistics engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Fresh agricultural products are the resident's daily necessities,which occupies a pivotal position in people's life.However,fresh agricultural products have significant natural present,China's cold chain transportation cost are quite high,and enterprises' have a weak sense of overall preservation.Fresh agricultural products are easy to deteriorate due to lack of fresh-keeping treatment in circulation and sales process,which makes it difficult to satisfy customers' consumption demand for high quality and low price fresh agricultural products.Therefore,this paper studies the supply chain system composed of suppliers who are responsible for the supply and preservation of agricultural products and retailers who are responsible for product sales,considering the characteristics of fresh agricultural product freshness gradually decay over time,the design of consumer demand function is affected by the freshness and price situation,then three kinds of supply chain structures considering preservation efforts are established respectively: centralized decision,supplier-led and retailerled.Firstly,In view of the symmetry of bilateral cost information in fresh agricultural products supply chain,We first discusses t the optimal value of decision variables under the Stackelberg game model in which suppliers are in a strong position.Secondly,taking the fresh agricultural products retailers dominated supply chain as the research object,this paper analyzes the optimal decision and their respective benefits under such circumstances,and then the equilibrium benefits of the three models are compared.Furthermore,Furthermore,we try to use the contract of “freshness-keeping Cost Sharing” to coordinate the supply chain with the model of supplier-led and retailer-led decentralized decision-making.The results show that the supply chain system can achieve coordination under certain conditions and distribute the system profits between supplier and the retailer arbitrarily.Then the sensitivity analysis of price sensitivity coefficient,freshness sensitivity coefficient and freshness attenuation extreme value is conducted,and the result shows that price-sensitive consumers will lead the vicious development of the market,while freshness-sensitive consumers will encourage the benign development of the market.The extreme value of freshness attenuation influences the optimal decision-making.The lower the freshness attenuation extreme value is controlled,the more freshness-keeping efforts suppliers need to invest,synchronously the wholesale price and retail price will increase.Finally,the influence of different ratios of freshness-keeping costs on supply chain decision and profit is discussed through numerical analysis.Then,aiming at the supply chain decision-making problem when the upstream and downstream members of the supply chain of fresh agricultural products face the risk of cost information asymmetry,Similarly,according to the strength of market power,the Stackelberg game models of supplier-led and retailer-led are constructed to discuss the impact of bilateral concealment on supply chain performance.The results show that the dominant members transmit the real cost information while the followers choose to conceal the cost information strategy.In addition,one member's false reporting behavior can improve their own profits,but it damages the interests of the participants,resulting in the decline of other members' profits and the overall performance of the supply chain.Furthermore,the “freshness-keeping cost sharing” contract is proposed for supply chain coordination according to the game in the two situations.Finally,the example analysis shows that the proposed contract can guide cost information sharing and achieve supply chain coordination.
Keywords/Search Tags:fresh product, freshness-keeping effort, stackelberg game, the information asymmetry, supply chain coordination
PDF Full Text Request
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